

THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

Vol. 10. No. 4

December, 1956

CONTENTS

Mr. Gunnar Myrdal—The Dyason Lecturer for 1957	
A Biographical Note - - - - -	3

Articles

Orientalists and the Orient - - - - -	<i>A. R. Davis</i>	6
The Restoration of the Chinese Empire Under the Sin and T'ang Dynasties - - - - -	<i>C. P. Fitzgerald</i>	13
Malaya - - - - -	<i>J. Falconer</i>	26
"The Ever Changing Commonwealth" - - - - -	<i>V. C. Fairfax</i>	35

Review Article

Searchlight on the Communist International - - -	<i>E. Bramsted</i>	43
--	--------------------	----

Notes

Recent Soviet Views on Asia - - - - -	<i>L. A. Owen</i>	47
Some Legal Aspects of the Suez Dispute - - -	<i>Harry Calvert</i>	51

Reviews

A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic (M. Philips Price)	<i>W. A. Townsley</i>	55
The Economics of Employment and Unemployment (Paul H. Casselman)	<i>James P. Belshaw</i>	58
The History of a Soviet Collective Farm (Fedor Belov) -	<i>L. A. Owen</i>	60
Red, Black, Blond and Olive (Edmund Wilson) -	<i>Richard Aspinall</i>	66
The Pattern of World Conflict (G. L. Arnold) -	<i>Bruce Allan</i>	68
Flight and Resettlement (H. B. Murphy and Others) -	<i>J. Zubrzycki</i>	71

EDITOR: H. D. Black.

ASSISTANT EDITOR: O. A. Guth.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Mrs. J. Legge (Western Australia), J. R. Poynter (Victoria), D. G. McFarling (South Australia), H. Mayer, J. R. Wilson, A. L. G. Shaw (New South Wales), T. Inglis Moore (Canberra), R. G. Neale (Queensland), W. A. Townsley (Tasmania).

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Articles

A. R. DAVIS: Professor of Oriental Studies, University of Sydney.

C. P. FITZGERALD: Professor of Far Eastern History, the Australian National University.

J. FALCONER: Who spent many years in Malaya. Now a member of the N.S.W. Branch Council.

V. C. FAIRFAX: A prominent Sydney citizen.

Review Article

E. BRAMSTED: Senior Lecturer in History, University of Sydney.

Notes

L. A. OWEN: Convenor of Monographs, N.S.W. Branch Council.

HARRY CALVERT: A student of international affairs.

Reviews

W. A. TOWNSLEY: Professor of History, University of Tasmania.

J. P. BELSHAW: Professor of Economics, University of New England.

L. A. OWEN: Convenor of Monographs, N.S.W. Branch Council.

RICHARD ASPINALL: Sydney author, journalist, and broadcaster.

BRUCE ALLAN: Convenor, Library Committee, N.S.W. Branch Council.

J. ZUBRZYCKI: Of the Australian National University.

The Dyason Lecturer for 1957

GUNNAR MYRDAL

Biographical Note

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

Mr. Gunnar Myrdal, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, was born on 6th December, 1898, in Dalecarlia, Sweden. He graduated from the law school of the University of Stockholm in 1923. Having practised law for a number of years, Mr. Myrdal turned to graduate studies in economics at the Stockholm University under Professor Gustav Cassel. After spending a few years working at various universities and libraries in England, Germany and France, Mr. Myrdal received his doctorate in 1927 and became, at the same time, assistant professor of political economy at the University of Stockholm.

After one year in the U.S.A. on a Rockefeller fellowship, Mr. Myrdal came to Geneva, where, in 1930-31, he served as associate professor of international economics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. From 1931, he was again teaching at Stockholm University where, in 1933, he was appointed to the Lars-Hierta chair of Political Economy and Public Finance, succeeding Professor Cassel.

Mr. Myrdal is a member of the Royal Academy of Science in Sweden, honorary member of the American Economic Association and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Among various honours awarded to him, Mr. Myrdal recently received the Gold Medal of the Royal Academy of Science in Sweden, a medal which had not been awarded since 1939, when it was conferred upon the late Lord Keynes.

Mr. Myrdal, a member of the Swedish Labour Party, was elected in 1934 to represent the province of Dalecarlia in the Swedish Senate. In addition to his professional duties, Mr. Myrdal took an active part in various reform activities in his country.

In 1938, Mr. Myrdal was requested to direct a comprehensive study of the Negro problem in America for the Carnegie Institute of New York.

During the war, Mr. Myrdal returned to Sweden. In 1943, he was sent again to America on a Government mission to study the political and economic development in the United States, as well as the preparations which were then under way toward the creation of international organizations.

Chairman of the governmental Post-War Economic Planning Commission for Sweden since 1944, Mr. Myrdal became a member of the Cabinet as Minister for Commerce and Trade in 1945.

In April, 1947, he resigned from the Swedish Cabinet and from the



The Dyason Lecturer for 1957—Mr. Gunnar Myrdal.

December, 1956

Senate to accept the position of Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Since assuming this position, Mr. Myrdal has given close attention to Europe's economic problems and to practical steps for solving them. He has done this not only from his Geneva headquarters, which is the centre for information on the European economy, but also through on-the-spot acquaintance with the problems of reconstruction and recovery, and through personal contact with government ministers and technicians in nearly all the countries of Europe.

Mr. Myrdal's scientific works cover a great variety of fields ranging from economic theory and public finance to housing and social reform. One of his books (*Warnung gegen den Friedensoptimismus*, 1945), written on his return from America, also was published in Switzerland. His other publications include:

- Prisbildningsproblemet o, foranderlinghetten*, 1927;
- Vetenskap o, polit, i nat, ekonomien*, 1930;
- Das politische Element in der national ekonomischen Doktrinbildung*, 1932;
- Der Gleichgewichtsberggriff als Instrument der geldtheoretischen Analyse*, 1933;
- The Cost of Living in Sweden 1830-1930*, 1933;
- Fin; pol, ekon, verkn*, 1934;
- Monetary Equilibrium*, London, 1939;
- Kris i befolkn: frag; Population Crisis*, 1934;
- Population, a Problem for Democracy*, 1939;
- Jordbrukspolitikern und, omlaggn*, 1938;
- Kontakt med Amerika*, 1941;
- An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, New York, 1943;
- Amerika mitt i varlden*, 1943;
- The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory*, London, 1953;
- Development and Under-Development. The Mechanism of National and International Inequality*, Cairo, 1956.
- An International Economy. Problems and Prospects*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1956.

HONORARY* DEGREES:

- 1938 — LLD, Harvard University.
- 1947 — Dr. Lit., Fisk University.
- 1950 — LLD, Universite de Nancy.
- 1954 — Dr. of Humane Letters, Columbia University.
- member of the Royal Academy of Science of Sweden.
- fellow of the Econometric Society.
- hon. member of the American Econometric Association.

Articles

Orientalists and the Orient*

By A. R. Davis

The title of this paper is a very broad one, as perhaps befits a first paper to a new institution whose traditions are not yet made. It is indeed a subject for a book rather than for a lecture, and I must ask to be allowed to take my materials and my illustrations from a part only of this immense field of which I have some specialized knowledge of some countries only, China and to a lesser degree of Japan. Yet I hope I may be able to point to a few general conclusions that may have validity over the whole area. In the time scale I shall, however, be more generous and interpret the term Orientalist somewhat widely by taking as my starting point the cultural contacts of the Jesuit period in the 16th century.

We can in this period between the 16th century and the present day trace distinct eras in the attitudes of the West towards the Far East. In the earliest period the West was prepared to treat China and Chinese civilisation in terms of equality. But with the material scientific progress of the West which culminated in the Industrial Revolution and the expansion of European trade, a superior attitude arose towards the Far Eastern civilisations. Since the Far Eastern states for the sake of their survival as independent nations were forced to adopt the technology and the economic and political systems of the West, and have done so with demonstrable success, they have gained from the West a new acknowledgement of equality. The equality of this latest period is of a different kind from that of the first. In the 18th century Voltaire could praise the civilisation of China as equal yet distinct. In the 19th century the Far Eastern civilisations might be openly or tacitly regarded as inferior but they were still thought distinct and arousing curiosity by their distinctness. Now, we have to realise that the distinctness in the current forms of these civilisations is very much less, that in literature and art they are becoming regional varieties of a universal form.

Against this changing background those whom we call Orientalists, being individuals, have played differing rôles in conformity with and perhaps occasionally out of line with the general attitude of their times. They have been men of different characters, missionaries and traders, officials and ex-officials, dilettantes and professional scholars, but have all made their separate contributions to a subject which has steadily grown in stature and general recognition. And as they have penetrated more and more deeply into their subjects, they have discovered an equality of a different sort, the equality of Chinese and Japanese as scholars in every field. Through this recognition they have been led into a new approach.

* Inaugural address to the Oriental Society of Australia, August 14, 1956.

the treatment of their study no longer with an Europocentric view, searching out minute points of contact between East and West and evaluating their materials by European comparisons: there are now many more studies which relate entirely to the structure of the particular Eastern country's own history and culture. I do not here in any way mean to decry the very excellent and important work that has been done on historical or cultural contacts between East and West but only to point to the acceptance of studies of Oriental subjects, as it were, in their own right, apart from any obvious utility or connection with European studies. It would no doubt be an exaggeration to say that this acceptance is general even among Orientalists. Yet if I have here represented the present stage of relations between East and West correctly, and if they are indeed becoming merely separate regions in a universal cultural pattern, it must become more general.

There are three periods, then, in which I should like to trace the progress of the study of the Far Eastern civilisations. First that period which we may characterise as the Jesuit period, since it was the Jesuits who held the intellectual preeminence in the Catholic missionary effort towards China in the 16th to 18th centuries and towards Japan in what has been called the 'Christian Century' in that country, i.e. from 1542 to 1639. The course of the missions in the two countries ran very differently. In Japan where there was a close and effective association with trade, great success was achieved. The report to Rome of 1582 gave the total of converts as 150,000. The very success achieved, with the fear it brought to the Japanese rulers of the loss of their subjects' political loyalty, was an important factor in the expulsion of first the Spaniards, then the Portuguese and in the extinction of Christianity in 1639. In China the story was quite other. China presented far greater difficulties of access. There were no opportunities for the economic manœuvres of the Portuguese and Spaniards which at first worked so well among the small feudal states of Japan. When the Jesuit missionaries did finally succeed in penetrating into xenophobic China, they were forced to make considerable compromises with the society which they found. It was only through their careful adjustments to the Chinese situation and the secular scientific and technical skills in astronomy, mathematics, clockwork, cannon-founding and the like which they were able to impart, that they could maintain their position, with periodic setbacks, for more than two centuries. Indeed it was the unwillingness of other Catholic orders, notably the Dominicans, to agree to such compromises, that prevented more than a slight progress being made in the spiritual field. It has been pertinently remarked that "the intellectual stress and disintegration of traditional beliefs in eighteenth century Europe caused certain Chinese ideas made known by the Catholic missionaries to have a greater effect on Europe than did the missionaries' religion on China". The whole Jesuit period in China bears the imprint of that truly remarkable man, Matteo Ricci, who at the end of the 16th century first gained admittance

into the scholar-official society of China. It was he who set the pattern of relationship within which alone the work of conversion could proceed. He adopted the outward dress of the Confucian scholar and he successfully acquired his language and a knowledge of the Confucian books so that the scholar could regard Li Ma-tou, as he was called, as an intellectual equal, particularly because of his mathematical and astronomical knowledge which astonished the Chinese. The practice which he began, of the study of the Confucian texts, has particular relevance to my present topic and he must be numbered among the forefathers of that branch of Orientalism which we call Sinology. He was also the first to devise a system of romanisation for the rendering of Chinese sounds.

Within eighty years of Ricci's death in Peking in 1610, translations of the Confucian books appeared in Europe: the *Ta-hsüeh*, the 'Great Learning,' in 1622 as *Sapientia Sinica*, the *Chung-yung*, the 'Doctrine of the Mean' as *Sinarum Scientia Politico-moralis* in 1673, and the *Lun-yü*, the sayings of Confucius in the *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus* of 1687. These translations along with the descriptive publications and letters of the Jesuits aroused the greatest European interest in China and made Confucius 'the patron saint of the eighteenth century enlightenment'. The influence upon European philosophers was considerable, upon Leibniz, who in his *Novissima Sinica* underlined the remarkable situation which had arisen by suggesting that "Chinese missionaries should be sent to us to teach us the aim and practice of natural theology as we send missionaries to them to instruct them in revealed theology", upon Voltaire, and upon Quesnay, who evolved from his study of China a new theory for the French monarchy. This influence has been in many places discussed and is not a subject for me here. Though China and things Chinese were by no means fully understood and were sometimes idealized, it has been said with much truth that "the ordinary educated public was better informed about China in the eighteenth than the nineteenth century".¹

All the while the infant Sinology was slowly progressing. The first significant study on the Chinese language was produced by a French Jesuit, Joseph Henri Marie de Prémare in 1728. There was also a turning from the Confucian books to other works of Chinese literature. De Prémare also translated a Chinese play, the *Orphan of the House of Chao*, which Voltaire had for model in his *L'Orphelin de la Chine*. Between 1777 and 1785 appeared the 13-volume translation by de Mailla of the large historical work of the Sung scholar Chu Hsi, the *T'ung-chien kang-mu*, under the title of *Histoire Générale de la Chine*.

In the 'Christian century' of Japan linguistic studies had also begun. In 1594 the *De Institutione Grammatica* of the Portuguese father Manuel Alvarez was printed. Though mainly intended for teaching Latin to Japanese converts, it contained also some Japanese grammar and examples

1. G. F. Hudson, *Europe and China*, p. 327.

of Japanese construction. It was followed in the next year by what was in fact the first dictionary of Japanese ever printed, since Japanese scholars had not yet entered this field, the *Dictionarum Latino Lusitanicum ac Japonicum*. This work was soon outstripped by the *Vocabulario de Lingoa de Japam* of 1603, a Japanese-Portuguese dictionary of quite remarkable scope. One of the editors of this work, Father Rodriguez, produced the lengthy *Arte de Lingoa de Japam* which Professor Boxer has described as the starting point of the scientific study of Japanese as a language. However, the Christian century did not quite attain its full span and the Dutch, who survived the Portuguese and Spaniards, shut up in their factory at Deshima, showed little or no interest in scholarship.

To turn back to China, before the end of the 18th century the prestige of the Chinese governmental and social system was lost with the revolution of 1789 in France, the country where China had enjoyed greatest acclaim and with the progress of the industrial revolution which gave the West a feeling of intellectual and soon of moral superiority. But the tradition of Sinology, which had been begun by the Jesuit fathers of Peking and particularly fostered by the French Jesuits, did not perish. Indeed it was soon to take firm academic root in France with the creation of the chair 'de langues et de littératures chinoises et tartares-mandchoues' at the Collège de France in 1814. This instituted professional Sinology, and from its first occupant, Abel Rémusat, onwards through Stanislas Julien, Pauthier, the Marquis d'Hervey de St. Denys, the chair was graced with notable teachers and scholars who worked within a university, and usually without going to China, gave their lives to its study. This tradition was distinctive to France and it was generally not until the latter part of that 19th century that other European countries followed her lead in creating chairs for Chinese studies. In their case the early occupants were often men of another sort, men who had spent many years in China as missionaries or officials. The French tradition was a link between the preceding Jesuit period and the time when a new recognition of the worth of things Chinese was to come towards the end of the 19th century.

However, for a long time the attitude of bustling, expanding Europe towards the sleeping and feeble giant China was very different. A note of aggressive superiority is heard and unfavourable comparisons are common. There is little sympathy and less understanding (not of course only on the side of Europe). I may quote as an example from the inaugural address of a namesake of mine, John Francis Davis, to the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society at Hong Kong. "To commence with the language of China," he said, "as a key to a great deal that remains to be known. With regard to the intrinsic qualities of that very peculiar literature which constitutes the archives of this language, my own experience does not lead me to be over sanguine in expectations from the future. My old preceptor and friend, Mr. Malthus, who left behind him an European reputation, applied to some of it (judging, of course, from

translations) a remark which is true of a great deal of Asiatic literature—that it was “childish”, in fact, a reflex of that general condition of society and intellect in which it originates. Some of the best specimens that could be discovered of their drama, their poetry and their prose fictions have long ago been translated, and the chief value of these has consisted not more in their abstract merits than in the light which they threw on a people so long self-insulated, and shut in from the reach of foreign influence or investigation. Their sacred and historical works, and more particularly the latter, which are bare chronicles of events little connected from the rest of the world, have barely repaid the pains of translation.” These strictures were levelled against what was at that time the world’s largest literature of which the speaker could only have been acquainted with an infinitesimal part. I have quoted at some length because I think this passage well illustrates the attitude of the Westerner in China, even when he took a scholarly interest in that country. It was clearly a carry-over into the intellectual sphere of the feelings of superiority which he gained in his political contacts with China. For comparison it may be interesting to set against this last an illustration of the attitude of the French Sinologists who stayed at home, by quoting from Abel Rémusat’s inaugural oration at the Collège de France in 1815. “Many Westerners have been brought to believe that the Chinese have remained at the first stages of civilisation. If I may run the risk of being reproached for partiality towards a people to whose literature I have given many years, I would like to try to bring them back to a less unfavourable opinion. Most Europeans smile at hearing of the geometry, astronomy or natural history of the Chinese. But if it is true that the recent progress of these sciences among us has dispensed us from the necessity of having recourse to the knowledge of these far-off peoples, ought we on that account to refuse to examine the present state of their knowledge, and especially what it anciently was in a nation which has never failed to honour and cultivate it.”²

But in spite of its often haughty attitude and its generally Eurocentric approach, the work of those who found themselves in China as officials, traders or missionaries made an important contribution to the development of Chinese studies. After 1800 the Protestant denominations entered China for the first time and they can claim many significant figures. The first to arrive in China, in 1807, Dr. Robert Morrison, is to be remembered for his six-volume dictionary, completed in 1823, which ran a close second to the first European dictionary of Chinese to be printed, that of de Glemona, printed in Paris by order of Napoleon I in 1813. It should perhaps be noted in passing that the East India Company subsidised Morrison’s contribution to scholarship to the extent of some £10,000. Morrison’s lexicographical successor was another missionary, Medhurst, whose work appeared in 1848. English versions of the Confucian books appeared from the same circles, just as French versions were

2. Quoted from Joseph Needham’s *Science and Civilisation in China*, Vol. I, pp. 38-9, the original not being available to me.

appearing from the school in Paris, thus replacing the Latin versions of the Jesuits. The monumental translation of the whole of the *Four Books* and the *Five Classics*, begun in Hong Kong in the 1860s, by James Legge, who afterwards became Professor at Oxford, is still not fully superseded at the present time. As the century progressed, the range of Chinese literature translated slowly widened and Western libraries' holdings of Chinese books and collections in private hands increased. The growth of Oriental societies and the publication of journals aided the progress of specialisation. Most of all the number of European academic centres for Chinese studies multiplied, in England, France, which developed a second centre in the *École des Langues Orientales Vivantes*, Germany and Holland. The end of the century indeed saw the beginning of the establishment of a corporate professional tradition. Among the minor tragedies of the 19th century period is the apparent lack of contact between Western students of China and native Chinese scholars of any standing. Thus so much work was done almost *de novo* without proper knowledge of the very long and very great traditions and achievements of native scholarship. This is a situation which the 20th century has rectified. The opening of China, the creation of universities of a Western style in China, sometimes from foreign and sometimes from Chinese funds, the outpouring of Chinese students to European and American universities, have brought a close relationship between foreign and native scholars which has immensely benefited Western Sinology. This has, as I suggested above, much altered the approach of Western scholars so that it is losing its Europe-centred character, and they in fact often choose and treat their subjects in a manner little different from the native scholar. Unfortunately, in the last six years these links have been almost broken by a new closing of China and an expulsion of foreigners. Now, when some contact is being resumed, we find that the scholarship of China at the present moment is not always of a kind that a liberal West is likely to regard as palatable or is indeed properly consistent with China's own traditions. However, we can only show patience.

I thus find myself in my third and latest period when China and Japan by the adoption of Western technology and political organisation have established themselves among the powers. With their political achievement has come a new recognition and interest in their cultural values. For example, a new influence has been exerted on English letters, and I think it may fairly be claimed that with the progress of study English writers who seek knowledge and material from the East are far better served than their 18th century counterparts. To a great extent translations of Chinese poetry have become recognised as a part of English verse, if we think, for example, of Lytton Strachey's comment on Herbert Giles' *Chinese Poetry in English Verse*, "one would be tempted to say the best that this generation has known, save that it has been written for the last ten centuries", or, more recently, the inclusion of Arthur Waley by the B.B.C. in a series, 'the Poet and his Critic'.

In this last period I do not propose to salute the names which have been outstanding in the recent history of the subject. The catalogue would tend to grow too long and I am sure that they will in any case appear prominently in the subsequent deliberations of the Society. Japanese studies have also gained an important place and, though for long they had less satisfactory representation in Western academic institutions than Chinese, in the last ten years their situation has improved. Sydney, I may note in parenthesis, has had a relatively long tradition in this field with my predecessors, Professors Murdoch and Sadler. This is a tradition which I personally am anxious should not die out. What I finally should like to discuss is the place of Orientalism at the present time. It may be useful to make our approach from the reverse direction. If we turn the pages of a Japanese learned periodical of a comprehensive type, we may find articles on subjects of Japanese literature and history, on Chinese subjects, for the Japanese are of course the most numerous and often the most successful workers in the field of Sinology, then we may find an article on the German philosopher Fichte, the French poet Verlaine, an article on 17th century English land tenure, an article on a problem in Homer. What I am suggesting by this is that our Japanese friends have recognised the universality of culture and humane studies. We ourselves have not, I think, yet realised this so well. In a chapter which he wrote two years ago in a little book called *Orientalism and History*, my friend, Professor Edwin Pulleyblank of Cambridge, remarked that it was highly desirable that European historians should, as he put it, "occasionally look over the fence". That he should need to do so is testimony that for us in the West world history and cultural studies are not yet integrated. There are, I am afraid, still some lingering vestiges of amusement at what is considered the eccentricity of Orientalists and their studies. It will be a valuable achievement of our Society if we can aid in finally dispelling these vestiges. There is perhaps already less of this feeling in Australia, at least, so I, as a newcomer, feel, and I am encouraged to think this by the support which my colleagues in other subjects have given to the formation of this society. For this I especially have to thank them. I should like to underline, then, that the present cultures of China and Japan, with the necessary allowances for psychological differences, may reasonably be said to fall within a pattern of which we are part, and their pasts which may have followed different paths from ours, are worthy of study in their own right, since they are humane studies or, let us go further and say, are subjects of a common humanity.

Have we in Australia any particular office? For it is sometimes argued that Australia has a special relation to Asia. We have a geographical proximity which we should use to the fullest extent in developing intimate contacts but beyond this, I doubt myself, as regards our Society at any rate, whether we can have any better or more extraordinary object than the gaining of knowledge and understanding on both sides, so that we cannot think this a slight or easily attained object.

The Restoration of the Chinese Empire Under the Sui and T'ang Dynasties*

By C. P. Fitzgerald

Chinese historians of the old school delighted in portraying the procession of their imperial dynasties as a succession of like to like, some better, some longer, but essentially agreeing with Shakespeare that "Amurath to Amurath succeeds". It did not suit their tradition to recognise that any one of these events substantially differed from the others, or that any example could have a peculiar significance. Believing, or at least supporting, the orthodox opinion that in the most ancient age China had been a single, unitary empire, they could not attach any especial importance to restorations of this empire if they occurred in periods long removed from the Golden Age of Yao and Shun. The Moderns, who do not believe in this golden age, or in the historical reality of Yao and Shun, can view the perspective of Chinese history with a different eye, and will perceive that at least on two occasions the formal change of dynasty marks a real change of direction and development.

The first of these was unquestionably the foundation of the first centralised empire by the Ch'in dynasty 221 B.C., and its continuation and consolidation by the Han; the second is the restoration of that centralised unitary empire by the Sui in 589 A.D. and its consolidation under the T'ang. In both cases the pioneer dynasty which achieved unity soon succumbed, and the work was rescued and perfected by a long-lasting dynasty that followed on. No one now seriously disputes the importance and originality, in China, of the work of the Ch'in and the Han. Even the old school of historians were forced to admit a certain difference in the character of the régime of these dynasties from that of their predecessors, the classical Chou, the early historical Shang, and the legendary or mythical Hsia.

Recognition of the Sui and T'ang achievement is not so freely given, and is sometimes misconstrued. Historians will see the T'ang as a great age, the dynasty of the poets, when many new art forms first developed and literature attained new heights, but some will simply see this as the flowering and almost the culmination of the Chinese culture; others as a brilliant, but hollow, evocation of a dying civilisation. I propose in this paper to suggest another interpretation, which treats the 7th century restoration as a crucial turning point in Chinese history, the moment

* Given originally as an address to the Oriental Society of Australia.

at which Chinese civilisation was cast into a mould from which it has never broken loose, the age in which, especially in the political field, China took a road widely divergent from the development of civilisation in other parts of the world. It will be argued that the Sui-T'ang restoration not merely restored the ancient empire of the Han, was not, in Toynbee's terms, a "ghost" of that empire, nor the full-blown flower of the old Chinese culture, but a re-creation of the Chinese world on new and enduring foundations.

First of all, it is necessary to recall, briefly, the history of the preceding age and the course of events which led to the restoration itself. The first centralised empire, that of the Han, collapsed in a welter of civil war and rebellion during the thirty years between A.D. 189-221. Thereafter China was divided, first between three rival but Chinese kingdoms, then after a brief reunion of thirty years under the Tsin dynasty, more permanently between Tartar conquerors who had invaded North China and southern, Chinese dynasties who were established at Nanking south of the Yang Tze. This division between North and South is generally dated as beginning in A.D. 316 when the refugee Tsin sovereigns fled to Nanking, and ending in A.D. 589 with the conquest of the last southern dynasty by the founder of the Sui; in all a period of 273 years. If, however, the end of the Han empire is taken as the year A.D. 189, when it fell into irretrievable confusion, the period of troubles and partitions lasted exactly four hundred years, and in the history of the political institutions of China this latter, longer span, is the period which should be taken into account.

The story of the fall of the Han empire, the troubles that followed, the invasions of the northern barbarians, the rise of Buddhism in a troubled age, the survival of the old Chinese empire in truncated form south of the Yang Tze, all these events form a striking and seductive parallel with the nearly contemporary story of the fall of the Roman Empire, the invasion of the Teutons, the spread of Christianity, and the survival of the Byzantine Empire. It is inevitable that observing such-like effects some historians should have looked for like causes. Some such causes can indeed be found. The depopulation of the limits of the Roman empire can be paralleled by the similar depopulation of the northern fringes of the Han empire.¹ A careful examination of Professor Toynbee's interpretation of these events would be valuable and would certainly reveal many other matters in which the course of Chinese and Roman history ran parallel. In this paper it is intended to take the sequel of this story in China, and show how and, if possible, why, that was entirely different to the sequel in the West.

At the end of the 8th century in Europe, Charlemagne, King of the Franks, a barbarian successor state of the Roman empire, overcame most

1. See Professor H. Bielenstein: *Emperor Kuang Wu and the Northern Barbarians*, 17th George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology, Australian National University, Canberra, 1956.

of his rivals in western Europe, and crowned himself Emperor of the Romans in Rome itself. He did not, however, conquer the Eastern Roman or Byzantine empire, his dominions at most barely covered a third of the old united Roman empire, he had no foothold in Africa, no authority in Britain, and only a very partial domain in Spain. Southern Italy also was beyond his frontier. His successors proved wholly incapable of maintaining even this limited empire. Within a generation little more than the title of Roman Emperor remained as a monument of Charlemagne's abortive restoration. The Roman empire was never restored. The Western provinces developed slowly into separate, usually hostile, national states marked by different languages and ever-increasing divergence in their political institutions. The Eastern Roman empire remained apart, and slowly succumbed to the invasions of other peoples and other cultures.

In China the first Sui Emperor, a Chinese named Yang Chien, reunited first the north of China, then conquered the southern Ch'en dynasty. His son was overthrown by rebellions, just as Charlemagne's heirs failed to hold their father's heritage. But in China the renewed confusion was swiftly ended, in six years of war, by the rise of the T'ang dynasty which not only recovered the full heritage of the Sui, but subsequently enlarged the empire to the fullest boundaries of the ancient Han realm. It endured for three hundred years, was followed, after a brief period of troubles, by the Sung empire, also virtually conterminous with the Chinese cultural world, and from that age onward periods of division were short, or caused by a partial foreign conquest, ages of union were long and swiftly re-established. The T'ang restoration set up the centralised empire as the norm, from which China only departed briefly and reluctantly. In the West, division and separation into rival national states became the norm, and attempts to reimpose unity, by the Spaniards, the French or the Germans, were resisted tenaciously, and never prevailed.

This difference must be explained by a cause more profound and enduring than the personal qualities of the two men who restored the empires of China and Rome. Li Shih-min, the real founder of the T'ang, was certainly a man of outstanding genius both in war and peace, but his successors were often incapable, and his work survived through the efforts of others rather than through the abilities of the Li family. Nor is it at all probable that the failure of the Carolingians was really due to the incapacity of the royal house so much as to the operation of forces far beyond their control. Beneath the surface resemblance between post-Han China and post-Roman Europe there were very real differences which are first causes of the wide divergence of the subsequent history of the two empires.

The extent of the replacement of Roman citizens by barbarian invaders in Western Europe has always been a vexed question, although it would now be generally accepted that this was not so extensive as

earlier scholars believed. In China, where more information concerning the population of the Han empire is available,² there is direct historical evidence that the Chinese did not consider the invading Tartars to be a vastly numerous horde which would drive out the natives and inhabit their land. It was accepted as a fact that the invaders were a ruling group who displaced the Chinese ruling class, but not the tillers of the soil. It would seem certain that in fact the composition of the population in North China was not seriously modified by a Tartar political domination which did not last for three full centuries. Skeletal remains taken from neolithic sites in this same region show no characteristics which can be detected as differing from skeletons of the recent dead.

More important, culturally, than the question of the physical make-up of the later Chinese population, is the evidence for linguistic and cultural change under the Tartar dynasties, or evidence which refutes the view that such changes occurred. It is recorded that in A.D. 500 the Emperor of the Northern Wei dynasty, himself of Tungus origin, issued decrees prohibiting the use of the Tartar language, dress, and customs in favour of those of China. It is also recorded that at that time there was a Tartar population in his dominions of no more than 14,700 persons. It is very probable that this figure may mean families rather than individuals, and if so, would seem a very likely figure for the families of Tartar descent who held political power and social prestige in the Wei domain.

There is some evidence, of an inferential kind, to suggest that the spoken language of north and south began to diverge at this time. It is believed that under the Han dynasty the spoken language of China was uniform (which it had not been in the classical age), and we do find that in the Sui dynasty, the first period of the reunited empire, the Emperor Yang Ti was credited with ability to "speak the language of Wu", i.e., that of the lower Yang Tze region, which may well have been that of the southern Court in the immediately preceding age of partition. It is also commonly believed that the dialect now known as Cantonese represents a close approximation to the standard Chinese of the T'ang period, which would mean that the northern form was brought into this southern region, then a colonial area, under the T'ang. There is thus some reason to think that a northern and at least one southern dialect flourished in the T'ang period, and this change is likely to have resulted from some modification of northern speech in the Tartar period.

Dialect differences, which have persisted from that age to the present day, have not, however, proved any barrier to the prevailing unity of the empire, and this is undoubtedly due to the very important fact that the written word remained uniform throughout China. Whereas in Europe the use of the Latin alphabet made possible the slow ousting of late Latin

2. Bielenstein, H. "The Census of China During the Period 2-A.D. 742," *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiques*, Stockholm.

by the rising Romance languages, and later by the Teutonic languages also, the Tartars brought no new script to China, accepted the Chinese form of writing, and thus, inevitably, the Chinese language as the vehicle of literature and written communication. Chinese literature was also the medium in which the traditions of the fallen central empire were enshrined, and thus the educated class in both north and south, no matter what their ethnic origin, were brought up in the culture of the ancient empire and looked back to it as a superior age.

The prestige of the fallen Han continued to influence the successor states both north and south. The "Empire" was never considered to have fallen, or been abolished, or superseded by any new order. Each dynast claimed the title of Emperor—of all China—regarded his rivals as usurpers (in theory at least), and held to the distant ambition of reuniting the whole domain. This type of political theory had some influence on Byzantine thought and policy in the West, but never seriously informed the minds of the Western barbarian kings. Underlying this sense of the provisional character of the existing partitions lay the fact that, particularly in North China, nature has not created frontiers within which separate national states could easily mature.

The wide extent of the North China plain merges very slowly and almost imperceptibly into the ancient delta lands of the lower Yang Tze. Low hills form such watersheds as are found in this region of intricate hydrography, the absence or the presence of water determines the nature of the crops, whether wheat or rice, rather than any sharp climatic border. Further west, the Ta Pieh Shan—the "Great Difference Mountains"—does indeed clearly demarcate southern rice from northern wheat, but this range lies well to the north of the Yang Tze, and consequently does not conform to the usual boundary of North and South China, the great river itself. The difference in terrain between the wet rice fields and the dry wheat region was an important factor in limiting the southern thrust of the Tartar horsemen, and thus a factor in bringing about the great partition, but no such difference demarcated one part of North China from another.

The northern dynasties occupied such parts of North China, whether hill country or plain, as their power permitted. They constantly endeavoured to destroy their rivals, and were by them destroyed. The political history of the period is one of shifting, transitory régimes, without stable frontiers, representing dynastic régimes rather than embryo nations. In the European Dark Ages, immediately following the fall of the Roman empire in the West, there was also a similar "Wandering of the Nations" equally transitory and unstable. But after a relatively short period this phase crystallised into enduring new kingdoms which in turn became the mould in which new nations gradually formed. The Franks made Gaul into France, the Goths formed Spain and the Lombards left their name to North Italy. Britain became England through

the colonisation of the Anglo-Saxons, but no similar process occurred in North China. No realm of the Hsien Pei or the Tobas emerged distinct and geographically recognisable long after the founding dynasty had passed away. The Tartar dynasties fell and their successors rose, but these events only affected a handful of prominent families, leaving the mass of the subjects of the rival kingdoms untouched and indifferent; for this mass on both sides was, and remained, Chinese.

As time passed the dominant Tartar families themselves became less and less identified with any particular régime or dynasty, allegiances changed with varying fortunes, power was passed from family to family within a small compact society, and this society soon began to include the remaining Chinese families of influence and prestige. Some examples of this intermingling will illuminate this important aspect of the period immediately prior to the restoration of unity. Yang Chien, who later founded the Sui dynasty and restored the unity of the whole empire, was himself a Chinese. He married his daughter to his sovereign, the Tartar Emperor of the Later Chou dynasty, and was thus grandfather of the last Emperor of Chou, whom he dethroned.³ He had married a lady of the Turki Tu-Ku family, consequently the Sui imperial family were part Turki, just as the last of Chou were part Chinese. But this Turki empress of the Sui was also the maternal aunt of Li Yüan, the Chinese founder of the T'ang dynasty, whose son and successor Li Shih-min, the great T'ai Tsung, married the lady Chang-sun, from whom all the later T'ang Emperors descended. The Lady Chang-sun was a scion of the imperial family of the Wei dynasty, the Tungus Toba house, thus the T'ang were related closely to the Sui, Chou, and Wei imperial families, their predecessors. Some of these families were "Chinese", that is to say had Chinese ancestry on the paternal side, others were "Tartar", descended on the father's side from Tartar stock. When it is added that the last Sui emperor was murdered and his throne temporarily usurped by a certain Yu-wen Hau-chi, who was a relative, being a member of the former Later Chou imperial family, it will be seen that ties of blood defined neither race nor allegiance.

In this age, and the T'ang period which followed, families of Tartar origin, the fact often revealed by their double surnames, continued to occupy high posts in the Empire. Mu-yung, Chang-sun, Yu-wen, Tu-ku and others, all associated with the former Tartar dynasties, remain prominent for some generations after the restoration of unity. Society at its higher level was a continuum in which the races who had met and mingled during the period of partition continued in power and influence under the new régime of the unified empire. No comparable fusion of Frank and Goth, Lombard and Roman, interchangeable and pervasive

3. The origins and intermarriages of these families are recorded in the Biographical sections of the *Dynastic Histories*, *Sui History*. *New and Old T'ang History*.

throughout the Western empire ever arose in the provinces of Gaul, Italy and Spain.

This was the condition of society at the period, towards the end of the 6th century, when a series of developments made the restoration of unity feasible. The Wei empire, which had united most of North China, had confronted in the south the successive dynasties of Ch'i and Liang, both in fact really one dynasty of the Hsiao family, an ancient Chinese house which traced descent to one of the grandees of the Prior Han dynasty. These two powers were too strong for each other, and their contests led to no conclusion. But after 150 years of relative strength and stability the Wei dynasty split (A.D. 532) into two rival houses, which in turn both succumbed before many years had passed to usurpers. In the South the Liang dynasty was overthrown in Nanking in A.D. 556, but managed to retain power in the upper Yang Tze valley. Thus in the second half of the 6th century the stable balance between two great powers became an uneasy equilibrium between four, much weaker states. It was one of the northern competitors, Later Chou, which managed, by the conquest of its rival Northern Ch'i in A.D. 577, to upset this balance and acquire a marked advantage over the still divided South. Later Chou was transformed by the usurpation of the Chinese Yang Chien into the Sui dynasty, A.D. 581, and this change of dynasty was swiftly followed by the conquest of both southern "empires" in A.D. 587. How far the fact that Yang Chien of the Sui was a Chinese—on his paternal side at least—made his rule more palatable to the southerners would seem disputable.

What becomes evident from the subsequent course of events is that the reunion of the empire evoked few regrets from North or South. When the extravagances and incipient lunacy of Sui Yang Ti, the second Sui, provoked widespread rebellions, during which his dynasty succumbed, there is very little evidence of a return to North verses South sentiment. The Hsiao family did indeed attempt to regain power in the Middle Yang Tze basin, but proved the least formidable of the adversaries of the victorious T'ang. Most of the other competitors for the Throne in the turmoil of civil war, which lasted six years, were northern generals, some bearing Tartar names, some Chinese, but all professedly endeavouring to win the whole, united empire, as their prize. After the triumph of the T'ang, the names of many of the southern great families appear in the Court of T'ai Tsung and his successor.

Several years after the triumph of the T'ang, the former concubine of T'ai Tsung, who married—incestuously—his son and successor, and is known as the Empress Wu, prepared to usurp the Throne from her own feeble son. The attempt, in A.D. 684, provoked a rebellion against her in favour of the T'ang. It arose in the lower Yang Tze region, but was not led by any member of the former southern dynasties, but by the grandson, Li Ching-yeh, of Li Chi, one of the most distinguished of the

early T'ang statesmen and generals. The movement was speedily and easily crushed, and almost the only reference to any regional character in this rebellion comes from the recorded advice of one of the rebels to his chief, to seize Nanking, since this city "still has an imperial atmosphere."⁴ One hundred years after the Sui dynasty had begun the work of restoring Chinese unity all that could be said of the south was that its famous capital still smacked of the vanished splendours of Liang. When, in A.D. 755, the rebellion of An Lu-shan rocked the T'ang empire to its foundations, the rebel came from the north, waged his campaign in the north, the southern provinces remaining throughout in quiet loyalty to the T'ang dynasty.

In drawing his comparisons between the Egyptians and other civilisations Professor Toynbee⁵ suggests that the restoration of the Egyptian empire at the expulsion of the Hyksos—the barbarian invader who had established himself after the fall of the Early Empire—was an abnormal event, brought about by an intense spasm of national feeling and hatred against a barbarous master people. In deciding that the T'ang empire and its restoration of Chinese unity was but the evocation of a "ghost" of the Han empire, it seems to be implied that similar Chinese revulsion against the Tartars produced this response. But it cannot be sustained that in China at the close of the 6th century there was in fact any such sentiment commonly held by the mass of the Chinese, or even by their educated classes. The Tartars were so absorbed, intermarried, denationalised and assimilated that it is evident that no such enmity was felt towards them.

The educated class, of both races, had been nourished on the Confucian classics, held no opposing creeds, spoke the same language, Chinese, and were no longer conscious of any differences between them. Their response to the restoration was to accept it gladly and work for the new dynasties which brought it about. These views were shared by their descendants, and nowhere is praise of the period of partition found in Chinese literature, or romantic regret for the lost empires of Toba Wei and Hsien Pei Chou. It appears on the evidence more probable that the restoration came about as the natural result of the thinning out of those alien characteristics in the North which the southern Chinese had resisted, and the general realisation that no significant difference any longer divided the two halves of what was still, in fact, one nation.

Underneath the surface crust of Tartar dynasties North China had remained essentially Chinese, in race, in culture and in speech, written and spoken. As soon as the crust broke, the essential unity of the whole country was apparent and at once became dominant. In Europe Charlemagne attempted to weld together under a Frankish dominion peoples already very diverse, whose substratum of old Roman citizens was deeply

4. *New T'ang History*. Biography of Li Ching-Yeh.

5. A. Toynbee: *A Study of History*, Vol. 4, pp. 85-86, 412, 413.

modified by invasion, depopulation, and the widespread collapse of the culture and structure of the old Roman empire. He did not even attempt the far more formidable task of conquering the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman empire, and had the attempt been made, it would most certainly have failed.

A closer examination of the real circumstances in China shows that they did not closely resemble those of Europe; the tide was set the other way; if both imperial vessels were equally stranded, one was soon to be refloated, the other to rot on the mudbanks. This being so, the restoration of the Chinese empire by the Sui and T'ang takes on a different character from the truly mistaken attempts to resuscitate a "ghost" empire such as that made by Charlemagne. It cannot be fitted into the pattern which Professor Toynbee has observed in the civilisations which he names the Hellenic and the Egyptian. The T'ang empire is neither an universal state arising at the close of a dying culture, nor a ghost evoked after that culture is already dead. Yet it will not very well fit into the scheme which would make it the formative period of a new civilisation, the Far Eastern, which Toynbee sees arising from the debris of its "apparented" predecessor, the Sinic. For according to the laws he has observed, the formative period of a civilisation does not take the form of an universal state, which, on the contrary, is the mark of decline.

The first question which the Chinese historian will tend to ask is whether in fact there can be said to be a real break between the civilisations which Toynbee has called Sinic and Far Eastern. Did the culture of Han China so perish that the civilisation of T'ang and later China must be regarded as only "apparented" to that earlier phase? There was not, as in Europe, any loss of the written record. There was not, either, any transformation of the language such as to make the ancient cultural medium a dead language. On the contrary, the style of the Han period continued to be the vehicle for the whole range of literature. There was some modification and change in dress, in architecture, and a marked change in art forms. There was also the introduction and acceptance of a new religion, Buddhism. Buddhism plays in Toynbee's scheme the rôle of the universal church, foster mother of the new civilisation. But did Buddhism in China really play this rôle?

In Europe, both West and East, Christianity wholly supplanted the old religions, and for many centuries buried the Greek philosophies in its own theology. After the time of Justinian there were no longer any non-Christian, still less anti-Christian, philosophers and scholars in the Roman world. Pagan rites continued another two or three centuries in remote rural villages, and thus gave "paganism" its name in the dominant Christian culture. Art became transformed in the service of the new religion, literature for a long period was a preserve of the Church, but virtually confined to religious topics. Except in Byzantium the greater part of the classical religious myths and the literature which adorned

them was forgotten for centuries. In Constantinople the knowledge of these things was a mark of the sophisticated learning of the scholars, and had no bearing on contemporary religion or political thought.

In China throughout the period of partition, when Buddhism was in its full tide of evangelisation, the scholars kept a clear knowledge of the Confucian classics, and the Courts and dynasties, however alien, never wholly abandoned the rituals of the older religion. The Emperor was still the Son of Heaven, still mediated between God and mankind, still held himself responsible to Heaven for the rule and prosperity of the world. The people took to Buddhism, but did not on that account abandon their older gods and rites. Buddhism made a great impact on art, bringing with it some new forms, modifying earlier styles, but never wholly dominating the Chinese artistic tradition. Like the Tartar conquerors, Buddhism in time blended with the Chinese beliefs it found so firmly rooted in the soil; in art it modified, enhanced, but never outed the older motifs and the native styles.

Its impact on literature and political thought was much slighter. By nature a religion which is not for this world, Buddhism did not seek political power, evolved no powerful order such as the Christian bishops, never challenged the Confucian conception of the state. If Christianity had accepted the Roman compromise by which Cæsar was acknowledged divine, had submitted to the Roman state, avoided the martyrdoms, and shared education and learning with the Platonists and the Stoics, the workings of the two religions would have been strictly comparable. But Christianity did none of these things. One of the most famous scholars of the T'ang period, Han Yu, who lived in the 9th century, seven hundred years after Buddhism had been preached in China, denounced this religion in scathing terms in a famous memorial to the Throne. Seven hundred years after the time of Christ there were no pagans left in Europe who could have written a denunciation of Christianity even if they had dared to do so.

Buddhism was undoubtedly the most powerful and benign foreign influence to reach the Chinese civilisation in all its long history, it exerted great and mainly desirable influences on that culture, but it did not replace the older religion nor act as foster mother to a new civilisation. The evidence for a new civilisation arising in the pre-T'ang period, but stultified and distorted by the premature evocation of a ghost empire under that dynasty, does not well fit the facts of the Chinese 7th century. The restoration of the Empire in that period was a different phenomenon, perhaps the exception which may prove the Toynbeeian rule, and by that fact all the more significant and worthy of close study.

It seems necessary here to try to define terms. What is meant by a "new civilisation"? If we accept the views of Toynbee, the Christian civilisation which arose in Europe after the fall of the Roman empire was such a new civilisation, though linked with the preceding "Hellen-

istic" civilisation. Others, however, see Western civilisation as a continuing system, changing in different ages, but essentially an unbroken development from its earliest origins. If the latter standpoint is taken, then it is certain that the Chinese civilisation is even more continuous and less broken than that of Europe. It would be agreed by both schools of thought that there was in the first place an original development of civilisations in more than one area, China being one such region; but those who disagree with Toynbee would certainly consider the history of China as showing only the development and changes of one continuing civilisation.

It can be argued that though this might be true in China, Toynbee is right in respect of Europe. The differences between the classical civilisation and that which developed under the protection of the Church in the early Middle Ages are really differences in kind and not merely developments. Without presuming to enter into this dispute more deeply, it is possible to use the yardstick which Toynbee has applied to Europe and then consider whether the same test, when applied to China, really leads to the same conclusion.

In Europe there was a complete change of religion, of language, and of political institutions. Art took new forms, and did not return to those of the classical age until that age was rediscovered centuries later. The old literature was either lost or forgotten for a very long period, then partially restored by the labours of later scholars. The new civilisation (the Christian) only in part coincided with the area in which the classical civilisation had flourished.

In China between the fall of the Han and the establishment of the T'ang there was a continuity of literature, historical record, and language. Political situations, though damaged by the barbarian invasions, were not wholly subverted. Religion was deeply modified by the introduction and spread of Buddhism, but the older religions continued to be practised and in particular the imperial cult survived intact. Art was enriched and developed by Buddhist influences, but the older art forms survived and blended with the new. Han motifs and treatment are present even in the purest Buddhist artistic monuments such as the Yun Kang cave temples, erected under the Tartar Wei dynasty. The area occupied by the Chinese culture in the T'ang period was broadly identical with that occupied by the Han empire.

I have here left out of account the dubious arguments founded on race or ethnic character. Whether the Europeans descend in part or mainly from the Roman citizens, or whether the Chinese descend from their Han ancestors, is not significant if the culture of the later age is, or is not, clearly linked with the earlier. The Chinese of the T'ang period felt themselves to be the posterity of the Han because they spoke the same language and read the same literature as their ancestors. The Europeans felt themselves to be different from the Romans because they no longer

spoke Latin, worshipped a different God, and cherished the tradition of their alien ancestry, whether wholly true or partly false.

On these tests it seems difficult to support the theory that a new, Far Eastern, civilisation came to birth in the 5-7th centuries of the Christian era. On the other hand, it is also evident that the restoration of the united empire in the 7th century set a new course upon which the Chinese civilisation continued for more than a thousand years, and which has perhaps only reached its end in our times. The restored empire was the institution which directed this development and shaped the later Chinese civilisation. It is therefore important to assess what that empire was and how its operation modified the social and cultural pattern of the preceding age.

The first Chinese central empire, that founded by the Ch'n dynasty and refounded by the Han, had succeeded directly to the last chaotic period of the Chinese Feudal Age. Although the empire was inspired by anti-feudal sentiment, there remained in fact some vestiges of the earlier system, slowly withering away, and society also continued to be aristocratic in character. This latter tendency grew stronger during the period of partitions which followed the fall of the Han. True feudalism was not re-established, but there arose groups of very powerful families both in the North and South, who tended to monopolise public offices and military commands. The government was always weak, the great families very strong. Frequent usurpations by these families, the instability and brief tenure of power of all these dynasties, had reduced the prestige of the Throne and enhanced that of an untitled but very real nobility. Under the Han empire itself public offices were filled by recommendation or patronage, not by public examination, which had not yet been instituted. Clearly, when the Throne was weak, such a system meant the steady rise of great families who controlled much patronage. The system under the Han and the partition can be loosely compared to that of the English government in the 17th and 18th centuries. Government was dominated by aristocratic families, but these no longer enjoyed the quasi-independence and legalised military power of feudal nobles.

The work of the T'ang dynasty was to transform this system, to create what the West had called the "mandarins", the permanent civil service recruited by public examination open to all literates. As the new system gained strength the old great families gradually faded from the scene, the character of society changes from an aristocracy to a bureaucracy founded upon a very widespread squirearchy. The growth of this large class who sought careers in the service of the state, who had not, for the most part, the resources to oppose or even to ignore the government and its service, created the enduring and overriding support for this form of régime. The scholar gentry needed the central empire to afford them careers; the central empire needed the scholar gentry to avoid the perils of too great local power, and the consequent danger of disruption

and secession. Whenever the dynasty grew too feeble to control its military commanders, the scholars lost their careers and the road was open to the adventurers from the army. When one of these had eliminated his rivals, he turned at once to the civil service to make sure there should be no more competitors for the Throne such as he himself had lately been.

It was the policy of the early T'ang sovereigns, who themselves had come from precisely this class of aristocrats, to devise measures which gradually destroyed the great families and substituted the scholar official for the placeman of a great noble. T'ai Tsung, who established the civil service examination, laid the foundation. The Empress Wu, his real successor, who for personal reasons was odious to the great families, helped it on by deliberately depressing the power and influence of these families—often with the executioner's sword—and raising up a class of new men, without powerful family connections. In the next age the invention of printing, which caused a wide increase in literacy, enabled the Sung dynasty to go further still and establish the civil service as supreme. The system thus perfected was taken over with hardly any change by the subsequent dynasties of Imperial China.

Expressed again in an analogy with the development of English government, it could be said that the T'ang period corresponds to the 19th century in which power was finally withdrawn from an hereditary aristocracy and vested in a society of educated gentlemen of moderate means. The step that has followed in the West, the transfer of power to the People has come—if it has truly come—in China only in the last few years. The reason for this long delay was related to the lag in technical progress, scientific knowledge, and the domination (partly a consequence, partly a cause of this) in the literary, classical type of education and learning. Had there been no industrial revolution, it would seem very probable that English society in the 19th century would have developed much as Chinese society did, in fact, develop.

Seen from this point of view, the restoration of the empire in the 7th century was not a regressive step, but on the contrary one which long anticipated the development which was ultimately to occur in other civilisations. The Chinese made at that time a long step forward towards the modern world; they perhaps overreached themselves in the political sphere, and failed to make equivalent progress in the natural sciences, whereby their further progress was delayed for several centuries. Yet this first attempt to create the modern type of administration, while imperfect and still retaining archaic features, such as the absolute monarchy, should be treated as one of the great creative movements in human history.

Malaya

By J. Falconer

I will begin by describing briefly the units which made up British Malaya before the war, since although the names were familiar to most, everyone may not be clear as to how they have been absorbed into the post-war Malaya.

British Malaya consisted of the Straits Settlements which comprised Singapore, with Labuan, Christmas Island and the Cocos-Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean, together with the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. These constituted the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements.

The mainland, excluding Malacca, comprises nine Malay States, four of which formed a Federation in 1896 and were henceforward known as the Federated Malay States. The other five never joined the Federation and were known as the Unfederated Malay States. These were all Protected States, not British possessions. The Governor of the Straits Settlements was also High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States.

After the war, Singapore was created a separate Colony, and the two former members of the Straits Settlements, Penang and Malacca, were included with the nine Malay States to form a Malayan Union which was later replaced by the Federation of Malaya, which is the present position: Singapore, a separate Colony, and the Federation of Malaya.

How did the British become involved in Malaya? In the 18th century there was keen rivalry for trade in the East, particularly between the British and the Dutch. The East India Company wanted headquarters in that region and a harbour where British warships could refit, and it selected the then uninhabited island of Penang, which it obtained on terms from the Sultan of Kedah in 1786. In 1819 Raffles negotiated the purchase of Singapore from the Sultan of Johore. Singapore was then a swamp, and a pirates' lair, containing about 150 Malay fishermen. In the same year the Dutch, who had been in occupation of Malacca for some 150 years, ceded Malacca to the British in exchange for Bencoolin in Sumatra. The East India Company, however, were firmly resolved not to intervene in the affairs of the Malay States and pursued this policy during the 80 years that it had control of the Settlements.

In 1867 the Colonial Office took over the Straits Settlements and continued the same policy until 1874. At that time, owing to anarchy which prevailed in the Malay States, piracy on the high seas was rife and British subjects were unsafe to trade on the mainland. Matters were

brought to a head when a number of Chinese British subjects went to the State of Perak to work a newly-discovered tin-mine, raising problems with which the Malay administration was unable to cope. The British Government then felt itself compelled to take action and a treaty was negotiated between the British Government and the Sultan of Perak whereby, *inter alia*, the Sultan agreed to accept a British officer, to be called a Resident, and to ask and act upon his advice in all matters other than those pertaining to the Mohammedan religion and Malay custom. The benefits of sound administration soon became apparent to the Sultans of the other States, who one by one requested the British Government to send them a Resident. Treaties were entered into by all these States, similar to that entered into by Perak, the last to do so being Johore, in 1914.

Now, what sort of people inhabit Malaya? (I exclude Singapore, which is at least 85% Chinese.) The earliest inhabitants are aborigines, said to be related to the aborigines of the Philippines and of Indo-China, but they are small in numbers and unlikely to affect the destiny of Malaya. So I pass them over, and we may say that the indigenous inhabitants are the Malays—in the same way as we may say the Australians are of Australia. The origin of the Malay is obscure, but those in Malaya are believed to have come from Sumatra and have been in Malaya a very long time. The Malay is somewhat small in stature and has a dark brown skin. He possesses great charm, can always be relied on to act with dignity and tact. He is very independent, has a keen sense of humour and loves to talk and tell stories as well as to listen. Altogether he is very charming, but—he is not interested in money and does not regard hard work as a virtue. In fact, he tends to despise those who work themselves to the bone just to amass wealth. If he has a piece of land on which he can grow enough food, and has someone companionable to talk to, he is content. He does not hanker after the non-essentials of life. Unfortunately, this attitude has left him economically very backward, and in this competitive commercial world his survival depends on his being able to adapt himself very considerably and very quickly. The Malays are Muslims and comprise about 50% of the total population.

And what could be a greater contrast to the Malays than the Chinese who form the next largest racial group? Most of the Chinese in Malaya come from the southern provinces of China, where they are mainly traders and merchants. The Chinese of this class love money and are never happier than when making it. They will work 365 days a year and not complain about a 12-hour day or more; and indeed Malaya owes a great deal to their industry and energy in building up her prosperity. The religion of the Chinese, if anything at all, is usually Buddhist, but it mostly takes the form of ancestor-worship. They form about 38% of the population. Which of these characters you prefer will depend on your attitude to life, but it is the contrast in character, religion and economic

status between these two predominant races which constitutes the great problem of integration in a United Malaya.

The next largest racial group are the Indians, who represent about 10% of the total population and are mostly Southern Indians. They supply some 70% of the estate labour force, while the educated are doctors, lawyers, teachers, clerks and technicians, etc.

The rest of the population is made up of Europeans, Eurasians, Siamese, Ceylonese, Arabs, and before the war, Japanese.

So much for history and ethnography.

The growth of the world demand for tin and rubber during the last fifty years brought great prosperity to Malaya and transformed it from a country that few people knew about and cared little into one of the richest and most important strategically in the Eastern hemisphere.

The Malay, however, was constitutionally unable to take advantage of the opportunities which these commodities offered for making money, so that while rubber and tin brought great wealth to the country as a whole, they did little to raise the economic standard of the Malay, the profits going mainly into the pockets of the European and Chinese.

In Government service, however, the Malay had special preference. The Government had always acknowledged that it had a special obligation towards the Malays and preference was given to them particularly in the administrative and clerical services, and there were some branches of the service which were not open to non-Malays. The rank and file of the Police Force were mostly Malays, with a few Sikhs, and some of the senior police officers were also Malays.

Up to the beginning of the last war this was a very happy land where all races basked in the peace assured by the presence of the British. It was undisturbed by any visible political strife, and any idea of a self-governing Malaya would then have seemed somewhat far-fetched. It is true that a Malayan Communist Party came into being in 1926, an offshoot of the Chinese Communist Party which had been formed in South China, but this was regarded as a purely Chinese phenomenon. It was not registered as a society under the law for the registration of societies, and even by the Chinese themselves was regarded as just another secret society with which their home country was infested and with which they were all too familiar.

Then came the war and the invasion of Malaya by the Japanese, with results which you all know. Between December 8th, 1941, and February 15th, 1942, at the rate of 10 miles a day they overran the whole country which they then occupied for some 3½ years. Now at last, when the Japanese invaded Malaya, the Communist Chinese had something in common with the British, in their hostility to the Japanese. On the same principle as Churchill later welcomed the help of the Russians the British Government enlisted the help of the Chinese Communists, and when the

British surrendered, the Communists went into the jungle to fight as guerillas. In anticipation of the retaking of Malaya by Allied forces, we supplied them with arms and ammunition and later flew in some British officers to train them in guerilla warfare. As events turned out, however, the Japanese surrendered and Malaya was re-occupied peacefully. But that was not what the Communists had expected or desired. They had hoped that when the Japanese had been driven out they would take over and set up a Communist republic in Malaya. Indeed, in many parts of the country, between the departure of the Japanese and the arrival of the British in force, they came out of the jungle and took over the administration. The atrocities committed during that interregnum by their so-called people's courts made a very deep impression on the inhabitants and left no doubt in their minds that Communist rule would be the worst thing that could happen to them.

The conduct of both the Japanese during the occupation and the Communists afterwards were such that the British were welcomed with overwhelming enthusiasm. I can vouch for that as I myself was in an internment camp in Singapore, and as soon as our camp was open the people of Singapore poured in, bringing gifts of food, fruit, clothing, etc., although they themselves were in rags and half-starved. The welcome was obviously sincere and very touching.

Then after about seven months of a British Military Administration the Civil Government resumed control. Now, while the war was still in progress the Colonial Office had given consideration to the future Government of Malaya when the British should return, and came to the conclusion that it was desirable to set up a single strong central Government to replace the separate Governments of the nine Malay States, thereby to create a nation capable of achieving eventual self-government. So when the war ended the British Government had a new constitution ready-made. They had, of course, had no opportunity of consulting local Asian opinion about their proposals. As I indicated earlier, each of the Malay States was in treaty relationship with the British Government. So immediately the war was over the British Government sent a special representative to Malaya to extract new treaties from the Sultans whereby jurisdiction was to be transferred from the Rulers to His Majesty the King, in the Malay States. At the same time the Government declared its intention to create a Malayan Union comprising the nine Malay States and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca and to constitute a citizenship which would give equal rights to all who could claim to belong to the country by birth or by a period of residence. Singapore was to become a separate Colony. Well, no doubt because of the relief which they felt at being free of the Japanese, and probably also because they may have thought that the new treaties would not really be so bad as they seemed, since they had never had any reason to doubt the good faith of the British Government in their 70 years' dealing with her, the Sultans did assent to them.

This new constitution, however, meant that the old political status of the Malays whereby they received preference was to be destroyed and that they were to be on a political parity with the Chinese and Indians, who owed their allegiance to China or India. When the proposals became known it is not surprising that they aroused the fierce hostility of the Malays, who formed an organisation called the U.M.N.O. to protest against them and to oppose the new constitution. So violent and widespread was the resentment His Majesty's Government had to retract, and a Constitutional Committee was then appointed which worked out a constitution restoring much of the sovereignty to the Sultans while maintaining a strong central Government. This became the present Federation of Malaya and replaced the Malayan Union on 1st February, 1948. One effect of this unfortunate attempt to create a nation was that it made the Malays politically conscious for the first time.

Now we come to what is known in Malaya as the Emergency—the outbreak of Communist terrorism. Now that the Federation of Malaya has virtually achieved independence and has a Government elected by the people, with a Malay as Chief Minister, and that Government is still fighting the terrorists, I suppose I need hardly emphasise—as I would have had to do to an Australian audience less than 12 months ago—that this outbreak had nothing whatever to do with the so-called struggle for independence. This is a movement inspired by the Communists and the terrorists are more than 90% Chinese—not the people of the country.

After the war, the Communists, foiled in their design to take over the country, lost no time in getting control of the workers in many parts of the country and in stirring up unrest, with the result that there was one strike after another until finally it became clear that the Communists were not trying to obtain better conditions for the workers but to bring the economy of the country to a standstill. This went on for two years when the Government decided to ban the Communist movement, whereupon the leaders went into the jungle and soon afterwards began their campaign of isolated murders by killing two European planters in June, 1948, a campaign which is now in its eighth year. Their main targets were the European planters and miners and Government servants, the idea being that if the management were got out of the way, the labour forces would disintegrate and the production of rubber and tin would cease. This, of course, would only be the beginning of a much larger programme to gain eventual control of the country. That they did not succeed was due partly to their own bad timing, to the loyalty of the Malays, and not least to the courage and determination of the planters and miners not to be intimidated although they went daily in fear of death whenever they left their homes.

One of the earliest measures taken by the Government against the terrorists was the recruitment of thousands of Special Constables. They were obtained by voluntary recruitment and all of them were Malays,

be it noted—the people of the country. Their chief rôle was to act as bodyguards to Europeans likely to be the victims of the terrorists. So many Special Constables were assigned to a particular estate or mine, and they accompanied the European wherever he went.

The Army at this time was small in numbers and most of the troops had not completed their training. Later on the Army became very strong and well trained in jungle warfare, but at that time the brunt of the attack had to be borne by the police.

Another important measure was one that was designed to cut off food supplies from the terrorists. The jungle does not provide food for any but primitive people. Long before the war Chinese peasants had gone into remote places, cleared a piece of land and cultivated it intensively with foodstuffs and stocked it with pigs, chickens, etc. Their numbers were greatly increased during the Japanese occupation when food was a major problem and many Chinese wished to get as far away from the Japanese as possible. So here was a very ready and easy supply of food for the terrorists. Whether these peasant 'squatters' were in sympathy with the terrorists or not did not matter: failure to comply with a demand for food was followed by vengeance swift and horrible. So the Government decided that it was essential to remove this source of supply and that could only be done by moving the 'squatters' into compact villages, surrounding them with barbed wire and putting a police post inside each village so that the squatters could be protected and the supply of food controlled. This was a gigantic task and it is estimated that eventually 500,000 Chinese were brought into these new villages, as they were called. I should like to make clear the purpose of these new villages lest the mention of barbed wire and police posts should give the impression of concentration camps. One purpose of the barbed-wire was to assist the police in resisting any attack on the village by terrorists; another was to make it difficult for any sympathisers inside to make contact with the terrorists, particularly at night. The people in the villages were free to come and go during the day. It is obvious that they had to continue to make their living as workers on nearby rubber estates for example, and had to go out to their work, but while they were out they might well be accosted by terrorists and told to bring out food with them the next day. So a law was introduced imposing severe penalties on anyone found with food on his person beyond a specified quantity enough for one meal. To ensure that the law was obeyed, the villagers were liable to be searched on leaving the village, but this was as much to provide an excuse for the villagers not to take out food as it was to ensure that Communist sympathisers did not do so. The terrorists, in fact, appreciated the logic of the situation and I am unaware of any villager having been victimised through not taking out food after this law was enforced. Sympathisers, of course, frequently contrived to throw food over the fence at night, but that is a different story.

The desire of the Government was that the people should take a pride in their village and they were encouraged to elect their own Committees of Management to administer their day to day affairs, and were shown how to elect them by the democratic method of casting a vote in a ballot-box—the first experience any of them had had of democracy. It was hoped that this would be good training for the time when they would have to cast their votes on more important matters, and that pride in their village might sow the seeds of loyalty to it and eventually to the country. They could also obtain titles to the land on which their houses were built in the new villages. Later on, too, they were encouraged to form their own Home Guards and were supplied with rifles and ammunition for the purpose and given training in the use of weapons, etc. When it was considered that the Home Guards were adequately efficient the police were withdrawn.

The whole aim of the Government is that the Chinese should come to regard Malaya with affection as their homeland and the object of their loyalty. It is obvious that this policy would be utterly defeated if some half a million Chinese were to consider themselves held in concentration camps.

The immediate effect of this operation was to make it impossible for the terrorists to operate in large numbers together, as they now had to seek their food under much more difficult conditions from a number of at least partially controlled sources.

However, bringing the Chinese together in these compact communities has an unfortunate aspect in that it must perpetuate the Chinese customs, language and way of life instead of breaking them down and developing a Malayan outlook which is essential for the future of a united Malaya. That is a problem which must be dealt with when the Emergency is over.

It has often been asked what the strength of the terrorist forces is. The number of terrorists in the jungle has never been estimated at more than 6000. It is, therefore, not unnaturally a matter of wonder outside of Malaya, that with the vast preponderance in numbers, equipment and technique of the Security Forces they have not succeeded in eliminating the terrorists after seven years of war against them. The first answer is the nature of the jungle in which these people live. The growth is so dense that it offers almost complete protection to the attacker. Nothing is easier than to shoot a man from the edge of the jungle and disappear into its depths. By the time the Security Forces are mobilised the killer is well away and to search for him would be futile—it would be like looking for the proverbial needle in the haystack. And when I tell you that practically four-fifths of Malaya is still under jungle, you can appreciate the difficulty of the task.

The second answer is the lack of public co-operation, particularly by the Chinese. It has often been said, by those in a position to know,

that if everybody in Malaya would co-operate with the Government the Emergency would be over in a very short time. Since the great majority of the terrorists are Chinese it is obvious that it is the Chinese who may be expected to have knowledge of terrorists' movements, and if they would give this information promptly the Security Forces would be able to take much more swift and effective action. But the giving of information involves the grave risk of grim retaliation by the terrorists, and up to date few Chinese have been prepared to incur this risk, for personal sacrifice implies a cause in which one believes strongly.

Now the only race that can be said to have any loyalty to Malaya are the Malays, and theirs is rather a loyalty to their district or a personal loyalty to their Sultan. Of the Chinese only comparatively few could be said to put loyalty to Malaya before loyalty to China. So too with the Indians. Thus there is not that patriotic emotion which brings the people of a country together in times of emergency and inspires them with a determination to make common cause and drive out the enemy. It is this lack of a national consciousness which makes the constitutional planning for the future of a united country so difficult. However, in the census of 1947 a large proportion of the Chinese population claimed to have been born in Malaya and the ratio of female to male Chinese was four to five, so that the conditions for a settled Chinese population are present and I think there is good reason to believe that in time the Chinese will become less affected by sentiment towards China and will come to look on Malaya as their real homeland. Meanwhile, the Malays are apprehensive that when British control is removed, under which they have special preference, the economic superiority of the Chinese may be translated into the political sphere, and so they are chary of granting too many concessions in the matter of citizenship which would entitle them to equal rights with the Malays. The Chinese, on the other hand, are afraid that the political superiority of the Malays may be used against them in the economic sphere.

As you may know, the first general election in the Federation was held last year. For the purpose of contesting the election the U.M.N.O. (Malay) party, of which the Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman is the head, and the M.C.A. (Malayan Chinese Association), which started as a quasi-charitable organisation to help with the settlement of squatters into the new villages and developed into a political organisation, joined forces and formed an Alliance Party, which had an overwhelming victory, gaining every seat but one in the Legislative Council. The main plank in its platform was the achievement of self-government, and that having been virtually achieved, there has been a danger that the Alliance may split on this very question of citizenship—the Chinese wanting to claim citizenship by birth and the party of Tunku Abdul Rahman threatening to withdraw its support from him if he goes too far in this direction. Up to date, however, all the evidence is that both sides are aware that no

advantage is to be had from a split on communal lines and are showing an admirable spirit of tolerance and compromise. But the British are still there, and when they have gone, will the Malays' fears that the Chinese with their superiority in wealth, education and energy will swamp the Malays politically be fulfilled? I am inclined to think that to some extent this is inevitable. I cannot see how the Malay can catch up with the Chinese economically within any measurable period of time. Much sooner, I think, is it possible for the Chinese, if only for practical reasons, to develop a loyalty to Malaya as their home and place where they have their livelihood and their possessions. Then, if they do not become too arrogant, and if they see to it that the Malays are provided with a reasonable standard of life, I think the Malays might accept the situation. On the whole, I am much more hopeful about the future of the Federation than I am of Singapore, about which I can only say a few words here. There the problem is not that of building a nation out of a multi-racial population but of ensuring some stability of Government in what is virtually a Chinese city. In Singapore there is a strong underground Communist element and it is only on account of the vigilance and courage of the police and also by reason of the small geographical area in which they can operate that these elements have been prevented from coming into the open and causing considerably more trouble than they have already done. Now the Police Force, as well as other Services, are being Malayanised, which means the departure of senior and experienced officers, and when their grip has been relaxed I think the inexperienced police who are left are going to have great difficulty in keeping the Communists in check, particularly if they have no strong and capable Government to back them. It is really on this matter of stable Government that the talks between the British and Singapore Governments broke down. Mr. Marshall, the then Chief Minister, prophesied blood and disaster in Singapore should his mission to London to obtain independence fail. As you know, his mission did fail, yet there was surprisingly little excitement in Singapore when he returned to report defeat—in fact, since then Singapore has been quieter than it had been for some time. All my information leads me to believe that a great many people in Singapore breathed a sigh of relief that the doubtful blessing of independence had not been bestowed on them, for they had little reason to put their faith in any local Government which could have been set up at that time. The fact is that Singapore has not yet sorted itself out politically. No one party can command a majority, and I think it would be well for Singapore if full independence could be delayed until the political parties have established themselves and have worked out policies more mature than the mere overdone slogan "Merdeka" or freedom.

"The Ever Changing Commonwealth"

By V. C. Fairfax

My real reason for accepting the honour to speak to you today is not that I have anything learned to tell you, but because I sincerely believe the subject is a very vital one at this moment. In the present condition of flux no one professes to have a clear and complete answer as to what shape the Commonwealth can, or should, take. The answer cannot be an academic one, and the best solution can only come if the minds of the statesmen are conditioned by the thinking and understanding of their peoples.

It is, therefore, of paramount importance that this problem should be thought about and talked about by all of us.

So today I do suggest that my best approach is to try and give you a few leads and for you to discuss it here for the benefit of us all.

The title I have chosen is "The Ever Changing Commonwealth," and I think there can be little doubt that it is changing. Since the Statute of Westminster in 1931, we have experienced tremendous developments. Events of Commonwealth importance appear in the news columns almost daily—the vital question of the Suez Canal is being discussed at this very hour.

We are all conscious of these events, but if we ask ourselves the question "Whither the Commonwealth?" or "What of the Commonwealth?" we find many and varied replies even amongst the leading thinkers and statesmen.

This lack of unanimity was brought home to me while I was in England merely by four headings in various published articles. These ranged from the despondency of "Does the Commonwealth Exist?" and "Dilution endangers the Commonwealth" to the more cheerful ones, "The Commonwealth in Action" and "The Expanding Commonwealth."

In other words, some people think it is about to go up in smoke or rot to pieces and others consider it is going to be a greater force for good than ever before.

Before we can evolve even the sketchiest chart on which to plot our course, we must try and clarify in our minds what we think the Commonwealth is today and what we want to try and make it in the future.

In order to see what it is today we must, I think, remind ourselves of what it was when it was an Empire. Only then can we estimate where the recent drastic changes are likely to lead.

* Given originally as an address to the N.S.W. Branch, A.I.J.A., 16th August, 1956.

It is unnecessary for me to detail to you the features of the old Empire. Sufficient is to say that the change from a unified Empire, inspired, lead, and controlled from the United Kingdom, to our present loosely-knit association of free nations, is a dramatic one—so dramatic that few of us fully comprehend it. Some of us are shocked, some confused and others see an era of tremendous possibilities.

Practically every feature of the old Empire unity has altered. In some cases their value has been depreciated, in others it remains unchanged, and, again, others now have a more practical application.

The effect of the changes are that today the Commonwealth is internally anomalous and we must realise that if we dwell unnecessarily on these anomalies we have less chance of making this association of nations work to the best advantage.

A temptation to confuse Commonwealth with Empire is sometimes too strong to resist. The significant difference is that a nation can be forced to be part of an Empire but it joins the Commonwealth of its own free will. The significant similarity is that what is happening today is not really out of line with the principles embraced by the British, who were developing a, then, revolutionary political system of fully democratic representative government at home, at the same time as they were creating their overseas Empire. They realised that democratic systems must be developed abroad as well as at home. By granting colonies self-government Britain alone, of all the former Imperial Powers, has succeeded in developing a Commonwealth of free and equal States.

This feature of Empire and Commonwealth evolution is seldom appreciated by us, but it is the most important factor of all to understand when trying to evolve a Master Plan.

We take for granted the ideals of free democracy and individual rights. They have been adopted now by many other countries and by international organisations such as the League of Nations and the U.N.O., but it was a dramatic idea for Britain to adopt them as an Imperial Policy, and quite new. It may have been imperfectly understood even by many colonial administrators and certainly by other countries, but the British Parliament kept to them and the Commonwealth has really evolved naturally out of them.

Whether some members of the Commonwealth family have acted impatiently and with lack of wisdom is a matter of opinion, as is the question whether the parent has always acted wisely and with complete understanding.

I travelled to England last year with a daughter aged fifteen. She did not always act in accordance with my advice or comply with my wishes. She had her problems and made her mistakes—and so did I—but as she grows in understanding she becomes a more co-operative member of the family and a more useful person.

In the same way the Commonwealth and its independent nations

must grow, and growth means change. Continual changes make any attempts to define the Commonwealth short lived in their practical application. The Balfour formula for the Commonwealth of 1926 placed great stress on the Common Allegiance to the Crown. Commonwealth relations were then conceived primarily in terms of constitutional integration, supported by economic ties and a system of collective defence. These factors have already disappeared as a form of unity amongst all Commonwealth countries, but they will continue to have an important influence amongst groups of our countries. This being so, they are properly no longer Commonwealth affairs, but if you strip it of all the unifying elements which we once held so dear, with what do we replace them to hold us together and, in fact, does a Commonwealth exist at all?

I have, so far, tried to set before you a picture of change from Empire to 1926 Balfour Commonwealth and the today's Commonwealth. When I got to this stage of working on this talk it looked to me as if there was very little of the grand old British Empire left, and for a moment it didn't look as if there was anything more to talk about. This is the very danger which is apt to beset us, and the reason why I said earlier that now is the time we need to think and talk more strenuously and search for the best solution to our rapidly changing Commonwealth before we are so confused that we do not know what we have got or what the potentialities are. This state of confusion is understandable when we realise that we have, in the past forty years, lived with more revolution than the world produced in its previous 300 years.

FORM OF COMMONWEALTH.

At this stage some people attempt to find an answer by trying to determine whether we should make the Commonwealth a really worthwhile club with a membership restricted to those who will comply to a set of rules or whether we hang on to all our members however thin the threads that bind them and however often they abuse the rules.

The restrictive membership theory becomes involved because the intensification of mutual relations between too few countries could destroy the advantage of being related at all.

In theory, if you insisted on a membership qualification of racial tolerance, sovereignty of the Crown, sterling block and defence agreements, you could end up only with Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the colonies and protectorates. As more colonies attained, as they must do, the status of full and independent membership you would risk reducing the territory of the club still further.

If, on the other hand, anybody can be a member and determine their own subscription and behave as they like, is it a club worth belonging to? If it becomes so loose and so vague that nobody really knows the rules, there can be little mutual respect and not much co-operation. This, of course, is the other extreme and it would be interesting to hear your

views on whether either one of these proposals will determine the future of the Commonwealth.

There is one rather healthy note—at present nobody is expressing the unequivocal desire to leave the club. They remain not for purely sentimental reasons but because the Commonwealth offers something which they are reluctant to do without.

The all-important question—"What is to be the future of the Commonwealth?"—has been ably discussed recently in two articles in the *London Times* by our own Prime Minister, and also by two articles in the *Manchester Guardian* by K. M. Panniker, who is a member of the States Re-organisation Committee, author, diplomat and first-class honours man in Modern History at Oxford. He is known to have considerable influence with Mr. Nehru especially in matters of history.

The Indian writer stresses the fact that the future of the Commonwealth cannot be left to chance development. He points out that all previous major changes and adjustments, such as the South African settlement, the Statute of Westminster and the granting of independent membership to India, Pakistan and Ceylon have resulted from deliberate action by statesmen in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions.

He suggests the necessity of a Declaration of Faith expressing the common ideas and political experience which may be said to be characteristic of the Commonwealth.

The Declaration, he maintains, should include statements on racial equality, the eventual right of each area to freedom and self-government and a repudiation of the use of war to settle disputes between member States.

Mr. Panikker is not in favour of any attempt to formalise the relationship of States, as he sees it as a period of transition when we should take all steps to develop a common outlook based on shared cultural and political traditions. He is anxious for greater co-operation in economic aid to backward areas, shared scientific research and co-ordination of university work. He places great emphasis on the value of Commonwealth thinking by unofficial groups dealing with every aspect of Commonwealth relationship.

Mr. Menzies in his articles attempts to come to grips with the more material and practical aspects of Commonwealth relationships. He analyses the change from a structural association to a functional one and feels that the future will depend on our means and spirit of contact and consultation and goodwill and resolution we bring to them.

He claims the importance of periodical meetings of Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers without agenda, but accepts the necessity for bilateral trade talks and regional defence arrangements. In many instances the day is passed when the British Commonwealth can produce a joint conclusion on these matters and the suggestion of functional or regional conferences for specific purposes would give the Commonwealth a more

elastic framework within which to fit new nations just achieving their independence.

Mr. Menzies ends by saying that with all the anomalies within it he sees the dangers of the Commonwealth becoming just a scattered family with not much form and with not much force unless we are all prepared to do some furious thinking and give the Commonwealth the joint authority and moral force that the world so sadly needs.

In the writings of these two men there is one thing they make quite clear and that is we cannot rely on old forms and old sentiments.

CHANGES.

I would now like to consider some of the changes and then touch on some of the potentialities. If we look at it quite dispassionately we must realise that devotion to a mystical monarch has gone for ever. True, the Queen is still accepted, even by a republic such as India, as Head of the Commonwealth. But the free association over which she presides is entirely formless. It has no common judiciary or administration, no constitution, no joint system of defence. Its legal systems and political institutions are varied and often contradictory. Its ethical unity is shattered since not all its members subscribe to the basic doctrine of racial equality.

The sterling area (which does not include Canada) provides some sort of economic unity, but we have signally failed to create a central fund of capital which can provide adequately for the needs of the more backward members.

Politically the Commonwealth lacks any real basis of unity. It has been unable to end the dispute between India and South Africa on the treatment of the Indian minority and it cannot tackle a dangerous issue like Kashmir.

Perhaps one of the greatest changes has been in the field of leadership. In the days of the Empire and the control of it from London, great Englishmen in all spheres gave their time, energy and skill to Imperial affairs. It was a vital part of the life of the community and a romantic one.

Today there seems to be a feeling that the nations in our free association do not like being led or advised and that they must get on with their own affairs. At no time has the Commonwealth been more in need of a wealth of experience and inspiration which must come from the full-blooded conversion of an Imperial ideal into a Commonwealth ideal.

I have made these statements without qualifications—there are some; but in the main they represent the fundamental changes over the last forty years. These observations once again tempt us to be pessimistic and defeated. Finding something a little difficult and to cover up our failure to come to grips with modern situations, we are apt to say "I couldn't care less" or "I wouldn't know." Those two examples in the English

language of a wretchedness of mental impoverishment and a flabby heart could not have gained popular favour in the days of the old Empire.

But there is a brighter side and a field of great opportunity. We, in Australia, can play a major Commonwealth rôle—it is expected of us, and if we don't match up to it we will let the side down. We can be a source of power in one of the greatest groups of nations and peoples that have ever existed. If we fail it is pure laziness in not accepting a challenge.

POTENTIALITIES.

Let us then turn to the offensive and examine some of the potentialities of the British Commonwealth of Nations and see if that can lead us to a Master Plan to which we can dedicate ourselves.

From the Indians we get the greatest potential stated in general terms of Mr. Nehru. He says it is "to maintain and declare to the world certain general conceptions about political behaviour, most of them proceeding from the principles of freedom, toleration and humanity."

Not many would quarrel with this as a worthy potential but many would say: "We must be a little more practical, there must be spheres of activity and mutual advantage to produce the enthusiasm for declaring ourselves to the world." Let us look at some of the opportunities—here are a few:—

- (1) First let us take economic development. Perhaps we lost our great opportunity at the turn of the century when the cards were in our hands and we could have built up a vast economic union.

There is still enormous scope. The Commonwealth itself contains more resources than either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. So let us make a comprehensive survey of these resources and plans for a co-operative approach to the problem. We have never been very good at this.

For this development to take place the greatest amount of attention must be given to industrial and agricultural research and the interchange of ideas and mutual help between industries to achieve greater and more efficient Commonwealth production.

We must have capital investment to exploit our resources. Britain is by no means flush with money for investment but might she not be wiser to consider large-scale investment overseas instead of concentrating on building up new plant at home.

The United Kingdom can hardly be expected to carry the entire burden, and is there any reason why the Dominions should not provide more capital for investment in other parts of the Commonwealth?

This re-distribution also applies to population. Has Britain any real plan on population and are there other opportunities for re-distribution within the Commonwealth?

- (2) Politically there is always a great potential in the Group atmosphere. This sense of "belonging" can spread to more units as full membership is reached by new independent States. The key words on group operation are co-operation, bi-lateral partnerships and multi-lateral team work.

Belonging to the British Commonwealth group is a distinct advantage over "nationalised independence", which can so easily lead to envelopment by the totalitarian imperialism of the U.S.S.R.

A group of Conservative M.P.'s in London have given thought to the possibility of admitting foreign States into the Commonwealth. One factor prompting this idea is that West European diplomacy has for more than ten years asked itself how the highly industrialised West of Europe, especially the Ruhr, can be brought to grow organically into the maritime system of the Atlantic Community and saved from that Union with the vast land reaches and mineral resources of Eurasia which Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin each sought to accomplish.

- (3) As a world force the potential of the Commonwealth is much greater than the Empire, as great as that was at its height. Instead of being a European Empire with overseas possessions we are a world-wide Commonwealth of Nations with independent members to represent our ideals and promote our joint thinking in Asia and Africa as well as Europe.
- (4) This leads us naturally into the question of defence. I do not intend to venture into this vital subject as it should be dealt with separately by an authoritative speaker. Perhaps the gloom of losing bases and the thoughts of neutral members in our midst can be offset by the change in the nature of warfare. I feel confident that the armed services are much better at producing Commonwealth plans than our statesmen or our industrialists.
- (5) Modern communications are another potential in developing the Commonwealth. The interchange of ideas between Commonwealth countries can flow today through speedy channels.
- (6) Administratively there is an opportunity for a Commonwealth-wide Civil Service which would serve anywhere in an advisory capacity on request. The British Government is taking steps in this direction and is making a pool of officers available for posting and secondment to any colonial or "near dominion" territory which may stand in need of their administrative training.
- (7) There is great potential for scientific and industrial research as well as cultural development on a Commonwealth basis.
- (8) The Monarchy despite all our changes still offers a cause for Commonwealth optimism. Its flawless record of recent times

and its self-dedication to service to the whole Commonwealth is respected by all and is still a rallying point. Stripped of most of its formal and legal powers, the potential influence for encouraging an allegiance to a Commonwealth outlook and a standard of behaviour is greater than ever. The Crown can be the symbol not of sovereignty but of freedom.

- (9) Within our nations we have a wide acceptance of a Supreme Being through many forms of religious practice. This offers us a common bond which the world of Communism does not enjoy. All we say of ideals of justice and humanity are shallow unless they are under-pinned by a robust religious faith.

The potentialities are wide and powerful but can't be left to chance. Bi-lateral associations and a hard core of closely-knit countries at the hub of the Commonwealth are not enough. Most agree that any suggestion of a Commonwealth parliament or any formal constitutional structure would be unattractive. At the same time if our free association is not always to remain a "Disembodied Conception" some form of Consultative Council, in permanent session, is favoured by some leading protagonists for the New Commonwealth.

Apart from any high level meetings of Prime Ministers and permanent secretariats the birth of a greater Commonwealth can only come from its own peoples. If they don't want it or are not interested to help it, it can't happen.

We have our lines of communication through trade, commerce, industry, science and cultural pursuits. If all the Commonwealth-wide associations connected with these activities gave serious thought to the ideal of Commonwealth as well as looking after their own immediate interests we would go a long way towards success.

As individuals we can all play our part and must do so if we are to establish the faith and enthusiasm in our way of life which is the only possible answer to a Communist world with its thorough planning and zeal in execution.

We do not stop to think often enough what our Commonwealth means to each of us. May I close by allowing Arthur Bryant to give you a definition.

"It is an attempt to preserve the greatest area of inter-racial peace, tolerance and just and benevolent Government existing on earth today. Its foundations are the Rule of Law, and the Christian ethic that recognises the unique significance of all individuals and their inherent equality. . . . Despite its frailties, limitations and inertia . . . no political society has fewer imperfections than this great global brotherhood of men and friendly nations. Certainly none is gentler to the weak. To see it grow stronger should be the wish of every good man."

Review Article

SEARCHLIGHT ON THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL*

By E. Bramsted

The recent tragic events in Hungary have thrown a significant light on the control which the Communist "mother" party of Soviet Russia and the state apparatus at its disposal are determined to wield over the ruling Communists in satellite states. To-day this dogmatic masterful attitude is a question of "blood and iron", of planes and tanks. Thirty-six years ago it was only one of heated arguments, of enforced expulsions and of assertive or condemning resolutions. But from the days of the victorious November Revolution the rulers of the Soviet Union have always insisted (with the exception perhaps of the recent short de-Stalinising episode) that they know better and that they are entitled to lay down the line which the Communist and Socialist parties elsewhere must toe. Whilst their tactics have frequently changed, the underlying basic attitude has remained the same.

The documents in this volume, carefully selected and edited by Mrs. Degras, offer a good deal of insight into the pressure exercised by the comrades in Moscow on Socialists and Communists all over the globe in the early, the "heroic" period of the Communist International (Comintern). The reader is aided by the valuable introductory remarks of the editor which indicate the context of each document and often quote from relevant comments on the questions at issue made at the time or later by leading members of the Comintern.

In many of the pronouncements of those early years of the Third International, largely formulated as they were by Lenin himself, a certain candour can be detected which was to disappear after Lenin's death. The resolutions, theses and open letters brought together in this book reveal the forces and aims of the Communist International, the difficulties with which it was faced and the changing tactics it pursued. Of the four congresses the organisation held between 1919 and 1922 the second gathering, first in Petrograd and later in Moscow in July and August, 1920, was perhaps the most important. By that date, the isolation of the new Russia, still clearly reflected in the documents of the First Congress, had ended, the Russian army was advancing in Poland, and there was a buoyant hope in the Kremlin that the Sovietisation of Poland and of

* *The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents*. Selected and edited by Jane Degras. Volume I, 1919-1922, pp. 463. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1956. £A3/19/3.

other European states was imminent. "Men and women workers!"—declared a manifesto of the Second Congress to the proletarians of all countries—"Solidarity with Soviet Russia is one with solidarity with the Polish proletariat. Under the leadership of the Communist party the Polish proletariat has fought steadfastly against the war on Soviet Russia. . . . The Polish workers are trying to exploit the defeats of their exploiters in order to give the weakened enemy the last blow, in order to unite with the Russian workers in the common struggle for emancipation." But the reality in Poland was to prove different. As Lenin had to confess a year later in a conversation with Klara Zetkin: "In the Red Army the Poles saw enemies, not brothers and liberators. . . . The revolution in Poland on which we counted did not take place."

Lenin, who had nothing but contempt for the ineffectiveness which the Second International had displayed on the eve of the First World War, always insisted that the Third International should develop into a highly centralised organisation with definite control over the decisions and tactics of the affiliated member parties. In March, 1919, the Communist International was only a propagandist society, but by August, 1920, it had become a fighting organisation which laid down the famous "21 conditions" for admission of Marxist parties outside the Soviet Union. As Zinoviev said bluntly, they were "put forward to make clear to the workers in the U.S.P.D. [Germany] and in the Italian and French Socialist Parties, and to all organised workers what the international general staff of the proletarian revolution demands of them". It was the last of these articles forcing each affiliated party to expel all members "who reject in principle the conditions and theses put forward by the Communist International" which led to a crisis in some Socialist parties of Western Europe. When at its congress at Leghorn in January, 1921, the Italian Socialist Party reserved "independence in the interpretation of the 21 conditions", it was promptly expelled from the Comintern. As a result the left wing of the Italian Party under Bortiga seceded and formed the new Communist Party of Italy which duly accepted the 21 conditions. In France, on the other hand, a majority of the Socialist Party voted at the congress in Tours in December, 1920, in favour of adherence to the Comintern, leaving behind a more moderate minority under Léon Blum which chose to maintain independence.

Letters from the Comintern to and resolutions by it on the national Communist parties, particularly those in Germany, France and Italy, form one of the four groups of documents included in this volume. A second group comprises the entire programmatic and theoretical statements of the Communist International ranging from agrarian action programmes to sympathetic comments on "the national revolutionary movement in India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Morocco, China and Korea" and to a pledge of "supporting every form of the Negro movement which undermines or weakens capitalism or hampers its further penetration."

To a third group belong statements on current questions and events such as the Versailles Treaty, the Washington Conference and the Treaty of Rapallo between the Soviet Union and Germany, all of which reflect faithfully the attitude of Lenin and his colleagues. A fourth group of documents is concerned with questions of organisation of the Comintern and with its sharp attacks on such rivals as the revived Second International of moderate Socialist Parties and the Two-and-a-half International of Vienna Union. However, the arrangement of the documents follows the usual chronological pattern of collections sponsored by Chatham House.

After 1920 there was a remarkable shift in the tactics of the Communist Third International. In the earlier years it had merely branded any "deviationists" and socialist rivals as "accomplices of the Counter-revolution" and as "the avowed traitors of the working class". Yet by 1922 the sanguine hopes for a world-wide victorious revolution having faded, the Comintern proceeded to propaganda for a "united front" with the hated social democratic parties. This was done from a growing recognition that the Comintern had not won over a majority of the working class, whilst social democracy was still strong. The motive of this change becomes evident from a remark made by Radek at the fourth world congress of the Comintern in November, 1922: "We entered on this road not because we want to merge with the social democrats, but in the knowledge that we shall stifle them in our embrace." No less revealing is a sentence in the theses on what was called "the Eastern Question" adopted by the same congress: "Just as in the West the slogan of the proletarian united front has helped us and is still helping to expose social democratic betrayal of proletarian interests, so [in the East] the slogan of the anti-imperial united front will help to expose the vacillation of various bourgeois nationalist groups."

Able led from Moscow, the Comintern demanded from its members a combination of illegal with legal work. A dual form of publicity, for instance, was laid down by the Second Congress: "First, legal publications, which without calling themselves Communist or referring to their adherence to the party, must learn to take advantage of the slightest legal opportunities, as the Bolsheviks did after 1905 under the Tsar; secondly, illegal papers, even if they are only very small and are published only irregularly, but which can be produced in small printing shops by the workers (either secretly, or if the movement has become strong enough, by the revolutionary seizure of printing presses) and which give the proletariat revolutionary information and revolutionary watchwords."

No less telling are the directives issued by the Third Congress in this respect: "Every legal Communist party"—they decreed—"must know how to ensure the greatest possible militancy, if it should have to go underground, and in particular it must be equipped for the outbreak of revolutionary risings. Every illegal Communist party must energetically

exploit the opportunities provided by the legal workers' movement to make itself by intensive party work the organizer and the real leader of the great revolutionary masses. The direction of legal and illegal work must always be in the hands of the same single central party committee."

Individual Party members who had done well in legal work could be promoted and admitted to illegal work. The professional revolutionary had to distinguish himself first in the one sphere before he could be allowed to enter the other: "Prolonged legal revolutionary activity is the best way of finding out who is reliable, courageous, conscientious, energetic, capable, and accurate enough to be entrusted according to his capacity with important commissions concerned with illegal work."

The documents presented here end with the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern in December, 1922. It was, as Mrs. Degras says in her preface, "the last which Lenin attended, and the last at which discussion was fairly uninhibited". In later years the often refreshing candour disappeared and the Comintern became even more the obedient tool of the men in the Kremlin. From then onward "expediency replaced a fixed revolutionary standpoint, fidelity to the Communist cause became a matter of discipline rather than principle."

Students of international affairs will look forward to seeing these later developments equally well documented in the further volumes promised us by Chatham House.

Notes

Recent Soviet Views on Asia

By L. A. Owen

That the U.S.S.R. has felt the necessity of watching Asian events even more closely since the emergence of a Communist régime in Peking in October, 1949, is not surprising. What may, however, cause an observer from the Australian angle to raise his eyebrows is the revelation that official Soviet academicians have not been awake to the movement of Eastern events. The war in Korea first reinforced the need for a fresh conspectus.

Now further evidence of a requirement for deeper diagnosis of movements in Asia is to be found in the new journal *Soviet Oriental Studies* ("Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie"), first published in Moscow in 1955. Six issues appear per annum. These issues together with two for 1956 have been received by the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The journal is the official organ of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

In the first issue for 1956 there is an opening article dealing with the "Tasks of the Study of the Contemporary East."

Intermingled with much Marxist-Leninist terminology one finds a reference to the remark of Deputy-Premier A. I. Mikoyan (already quoted in the June issue of the *Australian Outlook*) calling on the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies to wake up and "rise to the requirements of our time" (I, 1956, p. 6).

Soviet Oriental economists (it is said) "have principally studied the activity of foreign capital in the business life of Eastern lands" (p. 7). Inadequate attention has been paid to internal processes and to native capitalistic development. For instance, "such countries as Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, although not freed from the economic power of imperialism are now exercising an independent policy" (*ibid*). The probability of the clash of the native "bourgeoisie" with foreign finance capital or with local landowners is emphasised.

The writer of what in effect is a leading article does not think Soviet Orientalists have realised that the "national bourgeoisie" in India, Burma, Indonesia and Egypt is a matter of great significance. Soviet scholars should not exclude an acknowledgment of the evident positive rôle of Gandhi in the history of the struggle of the Indian people. Similar errors in the evaluation of "bourgeois" parties and their leaders are declared to have been made by Soviet thinkers in the case of Turkey, the Arab States, Burma and Indonesia.

It might be pertinent here to note that in *Pravda* of 12 Sept. last appeared a full account of the visit to the Soviet of President Soekarno

of Indonesia with his Foreign Minister Abdulgani. He was received at the central Moscow Stadium on the previous day by a crowd of 100,000 people. All the leading civil and military dignitaries were there.

A joint Declaration of Agreement was published in the same edition. It provided:—

1. Both countries should respect the principles of territorial inviolability and sovereignty, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual help and peaceful coexistence.
2. In regard to such international questions as disarmament, the struggle against colonialism, the prohibition of the use and testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs, the two countries were to be guided by the spirit and principles of the Bandung Conference.

Furthermore, hostility to military pacts was expressed. China's People's Republic should, it was agreed, hold its legal seat in the United Nations.

The Suez Canal situation should be arranged peacefully on the basis of the full recognition of the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt.

The negotiations then proceeding in Djakarta should conclude, both sides affirmed, with a technical-economic agreement, and in particular with the granting by the Soviet Union of a long-term credit to Indonesia and of raw materials and other goods by Indonesia to the Soviet Union.

In the cultural fields there were to be arranged exchanges of delegations, students and specialists in particular in art and science.

The Soviet President of the Supreme Presidium, K. Voroshilov, was to be invited at an appropriate time to visit Indonesia.

In his address at the Stadium, President Soekarno remarked that he was pleased that, as he had requested, they called him simply "Brother Karno" (*Pravda*, 12 Sept., 1956, p. 2) instead of "Your Excellency President Soekarno."

In a speech that appeared to be very cordial, Soekarno set forth the Indonesian point of view. For Australia the most significant feature of his remarks was his reference to West New Guinea.

"The struggle of the Indonesian people is not yet completed either politically or economically. Politically it is not yet complete as long as we have to fight for an inseparable part of the Indonesian Republic—West Irian."

Reverting once more to *Soviet Oriental Studies*, one could note the changed Soviet viewpoint according to which the attainment of sovereignty by Eastern peoples is now regarded, not as a secret deal of the native "bourgeoisie" with foreign "imperialists", but rather as an indirect spontaneous power of the popular masses acting on the course of historic events (p. 8).

It is now maintained that "Facts show the growth in the authority of the Soviet Union, the tremendous power of the whole socialist bloc, especially after the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, the defeat of the imperialist armies in Korea and Vietnam, the solidarity of the

workers in the home countries with the colonial peoples, and finally the general development of the national liberation movement in the East." These factors are regarded as causing the "colonisers" to withdraw to avoid the unleashing of wars on a large scale (p. 9).

The author of the article criticises Soviet scholars for not having revealed the concrete significance of the land reforms in India, Egypt, Burma, Syria and other lands (p. 9). These reforms do not (he thinks) satisfy the desires of all layers of the peasantry. However, "they weaken or even undermine the system of feudal exploitation of the peasantry" (p. 9).

"Incipient industrialisation of the newly-independent states assists the consolidation of national independence, sharpens the economic contradictions between these countries and imperialism, and, specifically, the contradictions between the national 'bourgeoisie' on one hand and foreign monopolies and the local feudal reaction on the other" (p. 9).

Japan's Premier Mr. Hatoyama has just concluded an agreement bringing to an end the state of war with Russia.

It is therefore of interest to notice a reference to the treatment of Japan. Soviet Oriental literature has, it is considered, made mistakes in the analysis of the post-war position of Japan (p. 9).

Some Soviet Orientalists (it is indicated) make the mistake of regarding Japan—a highly developed industrial state with powerful monopolies—as on a level with semi-colonial countries. These students underestimate Japan's capacity for independent economic development and the depth of Japanese-American differences (p. 9).

Others, it is maintained, have neglected the progressive aspects in such important elements as agrarian reform and labour legislation (p. 9).

These phenomena are regarded by *Oriental Studies* as having sprung from the post-war democratic movement which developed in the country.

Another feature criticised is the apparent "idealisation of Tsarist policy in China and other Eastern countries, in spite of historical facts" (p. 9). This point, raised at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, was admitted to need clarification to avoid confusion between old Tsarist and new Soviet policy.

The journal acknowledges the great responsibility laid upon it. It admits that the leading rôle in the development of Soviet Oriental Studies has been accorded to the Institute of Oriental Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences where work the majority of specialists in all fields.

"The necessity to concentrate the attention of scholars on the study of questions of the present day and the need to found a single co-ordinating centre of all Oriental Studies, have been the chief reasons for the reorganisation effected in 1950 in the scientific-research work in the area of Eastern Studies" (p. 10).

The present writer would draw attention to the date—1950. This followed closely on two events—one the foundation of the Communist régime in Peking in Oct., 1949, and the other the Korean War which broke out in June, 1950.

The establishment of the journal now being discussed may be regarded as a sequel to the Geneva Conference of July, 1954, and the visits of Premier Bulganin, Secretary Krushchov and Deputy-Premier Mikoyan to Peking.

It is declared that articles produced by the Institute have included a History of the (Outer) Mongolian People's Republic; dictionaries, Chinese-Russian, Urdu-Russian and Hindu-Russian; monographs on the contemporary political and economic positions of India, Japan and Mongolia. A ten-volume World History is also being prepared.

Interest in Eastern affairs had become so magnified recently (it was revealed) that it was obvious how inadequate had been the coverage of such matters in the Soviet. What may surprise us is to learn that not a single book had been so far issued by the Soviet Institute on the Chinese People's Republic or the Republic of Vietnam. There had not been any published work on Indonesia or Burma. There had been no new investigations on the present-day position in Egypt and other Arab countries, in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was hardly any popular scientific literature for Russians on the different Eastern lands. African problems had not been touched by the Institute despite its scientific duty to have done so (p. 10).

Incorrect planning (it was admitted) had brought this about as well as ill-judged selection and arrangement of staff. India, Pakistan, Indonesia and all South-East Asian countries had only as many senior scientific workers as Iran, Turkey and Mongolia (p. 11).

Staffs were unqualified to handle the various countries of South-East Asia and Africa besides the economic side of the countries of the Middle and Far East. Indonesia had been noticeably neglected.

A revision was needed in the training of undergraduates. The Institute must take a hand in the preparation of staffs and the arrangement of the teaching of Eastern Studies in higher educational institutions.

No attention had been paid by the Council of the Institute to the Higher Educational Institute Programmes on the History and Economics of the East (p. 11).

Unfortunately, it had to be acknowledged that the Institute had not yet become the centre co-ordinating the work of the Orientalists of the U.S.S.R. There was a lot of talk about co-ordination but nothing had been done.

There must be an end (it was urged) of the duplication of activity in the Oriental Studies field. The Institute of Oriental Studies, the office of the corresponding departments of the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Higher Education must work together. Contact must be made with the Orientalists of the Eastern and Western People's Democracies and with those of other foreign lands.

The first All-Union Conference of Oriental Scholars would soon be convened (*ibid.* p. 11).

NOTE: The writer is responsible for the translations made from the original Russian of *Vostokovedenie*, I, 1956, and *Pravda*.

Some Legal Aspects of the Suez Dispute

By Harry Calvert

The conduct of international relations must be based upon either order or anarchy. To protagonists of force, this note is irrelevant beyond reminding them that they have no valid ground for complaint when they find themselves to be the victims of their chosen instrument. To others, however, a consideration of the legal issues involved may make first of all for a better understanding of the position, for international law is the framework of order and the chosen criterion of the signatories of the Charter of the United Nations;¹ and secondly, for an appreciation of the soundness or otherwise of the claims upon which the parties to the dispute have based their action.

When considering the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, variously described as 'theft' and 'confiscation', two preliminary questions must be answered:—

1. What interests, if any, may be expropriated by a Sovereign?
and
2. On what terms?

Each of these questions involves in itself several subsidiary questions. In determining the first, we are concerned with the nature of the Company's interest. It is admitted that the interest when first created was a concession, that is, a relationship subsisting between a sovereign and an individual alien, regulating the exploitation of subject matter within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. We must, however, consider subsequent events. Did the 1888 Convention² elevate the status of the interest either immediately, or mediately (by virtue of the creation of a state servitude),³ and what was the effect of subsequent treaties, bearing in mind the judgment of the I.C.J. in the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Jurisdiction) Case*,⁴ where the 'elevation' argument was brought forward and rejected? It has even been suggested that since the Company is a public company, the interest held thereby loses its private (and therefore expropriable) nature, though this argument is perhaps less tenable than the others.

Should these considerations persuade us that the Company's interest was an expropriable one, we are then faced with the second question,

1. U.N. Charter, Article I (1).

2. *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 369-373.

3. Reid: *International Servitudes in Law and Practice* (University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 138.

4. *I.C.J. Reports*, 1951, p. 89.

which involves a search into Egyptian law, to ascertain the internal constitutional position, and, in the international sphere, into the offer of compensation, which, it is fairly settled, must be adequate, prompt and real. Nasser's offer accompanied the nationalisation decree and could hardly have been prompter. Adequacy (current rates on the Paris Bourse) also seems satisfied, whilst reality, turning as it does upon the medium of compensation (gold? sterling? bonds?), is a matter for economists.

These are the subsidiary elements upon which the validity of the expropriation depends; but they offer no solution at all to the matter of the effect of the nationalisation upon the 1888 Convention and the pretended 'International Status' of the Canal. The two matters are obviously tied up together and may be thus considered. We may legitimately pose the following questions:—

1. Did the Convention establish an 'international status' for the Canal? The term used in the Convention was 'free use',⁵ and the interpretation of these words is of vital importance. There must obviously be some limit to their extent. Would Egypt, for instance, be justified in obstructing a vessel relying upon the right of 'free use' to bombard one of the Egyptian ports (remembering that by virtue of Article XI, 'free use' overrides the rights of defence and maintenance of public order⁶)? Great Britain, in two World Wars, has been largely responsible for the development of a doctrine of 'hostile acts',⁷ which operates as a restriction on the meaning of 'free use' to (a) the bounds already recognised in the right of 'innocent passage' through territorial waters, plus (b) a similar right for 'innocent' men-o'-war. In other words, the concept of an absolute 'international status' is a misleading one.

2. Assuming a limited 'international status', how is this infringed by the transfer of the control of the Canal Company (noting that there has been no change in the *power* of control of the Canal itself⁸). There is obviously no direct infringement. The question really is 'Can action be justified by apprehension of infringement?' There must obviously be more than a mere possibility of infringement, which always exists. In the case under discussion, the discrimination against Israel shipping since 1948 is relied upon as evidencing the likelihood of interference. Two further points become relevant here. First, is there any complication in the legal position since nationalisation which would justify much more serious measures in the present case of mere apprehension, than were in fact adopted when an ACTUAL breach took place; and second, was there an actual breach in the Israeli case? Before we can attempt to answer

5. Articles VIII, XI, XII; Article I uses the term 'free and open', and Articles IV and VIII, 'free passage'.

6. Article X.

7. Under Article IV.

8. Egyptian control was anticipated, Article XIV providing for the continuance of the Convention after the expiry of the concession. The framers of the Convention apparently did not consider Egyptian control to be incompatible with the Convention.

these points, we must go back yet further, for we are assuming that the Convention binds Egypt. This is not necessarily so. She was not a signatory to it, being at the time a Province of the Ottoman Empire. Did the treaty 'make law' for Egypt? Did it establish custom? Has Egypt expressly bound herself according to its terms? Is she bound as successor state to the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain?⁹ Is she bound by acquiescence? Any one of these could form a sufficient nexus, but at least one must be proved, and even then there remains the possibility that she has subsequently been released from her obligations, either by war, or by a vital change in circumstances.

Even if the 1888 Convention binds her, was Egypt actually guilty of a breach, in the Israeli case? The Security Council said 'yes',¹⁰ but in doing so, they rejected Egypt's contention that the Armistice had not terminated the state of war with Israel, a plea in support of which there is abundant authority. They also assumed that a state of war is a necessary prerequisite to otherwise lawful discriminatory measures, though the basis for this assumption was not made clear. Certainly, it is not required by the terms of the Convention. They also decided, in the words of the United Kingdom representative, that 'It is not necessary for the Security Council to become entangled in the maze of legal arguments',¹¹ yet not only is it difficult to see how they could otherwise arrive at a just conclusion, but also, express provision is made in the Charter for reference of such a 'maze of legal arguments' to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.¹² Finally, the constitution of the Security Council in this instance must detract from the value of the decision. Five of the members were important users of the Canal, in whose interest it obviously was to condemn any incursion, and who had, in fact, already protested to Egypt about her action. Challenged by Egypt on the grounds that they were 'judges in their own cause' (and therefore, in cases under Chapter VI of the Charter, bound to abstain¹³), the five members concerned went into a huddle and decided that they were not judges in their own cause, thus acting as judges in the cause of whether they were judges in their own cause!

So the precedent relied upon by those nations apprehending a breach is not as reliable as one might wish.

The Canal question then entered its second phase, the Israeli attack, before most of the issues of the first phase had been touched upon, and in this second phase the question of aggression immediately arises. Britain and France entered the arena, and again the question of aggression

9. The United Kingdom became 'protector' of Egypt in 1905 and replaced Turkey under the Peace Treaties after the First World War.

10. Resolution of 1st September, 1951; U.M. Doc. S/2298/Rev. 1.

11. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, at S./P.V. 550, p. 51.

12. U.N. Charter, Article 96; Statute of I.C.J., Articles 65-68.

13. Article 27(3).

loomed large. Although the bounds of aggression are not clearly defined,¹⁴ there can be little doubt that in the absence of any lawful justification, the invasion of the territory of another State by force of arms falls within them. Possible grounds of justification must therefore be examined.

Self-defence may apply so far as Israel is concerned. This is an involved question of fact. It can only apply so far as the Anglo-French action is concerned by a resort to fictions. The nationalisation of the Canal Company and the Israeli attack on Egypt can hardly be construed as acts of aggression upon Britain and France. Two other possible justifications fall to be considered. The United Kingdom, as a party to two treaties, might claim to be justified (a) in guaranteeing the Egypt-Israeli border by sending in troops under the tripartite guarantee.¹⁵ Two specific objections to this plea are to be found in the facts that (i) the assault had as its object the Canal Zone, not the area of hostilities; (ii) the action was taken without consultation among all parties to the guarantee: (b) in sending troops into the Canal Zone under the Suez Agreement,¹⁶ where there arise again two specific objections; (i) the Agreement makes no provision for joint Anglo-French action; (ii) Egypt, the other party to the agreement, claimed herself to be competent to deal with the situation, and refused the offer of help. To both these purported justifications, the tripartite guarantee and the Suez Agreement, a general objection applies. This is Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, which restricts the application of all treaties insofar as they are inconsistent with the Charter.

The other possible justification for the Anglo-French action is express legal authority from the United Nations, which is the essence of the Anglo-French claim that their assault was 'police action'. There is nothing magical about this term. Unless it has the backing of law, it is just as culpable as any other unlawful use of force. The question here, then, is: did the U.N.O. authorise the Anglo-French action? The Korean precedent has been cited in this connection, but it differs on the vital point. In the Korean case, there was no prior consideration by any organ of the United Nations Organisation. There was therefore room for subsequent ratification. In the case in point, the rejection by Britain and France of the American motion, seeking to confine the use of force to the terms of the Charter, precluded any subsequent ratification of their action.

This list of issues does not claim to be exhaustive. It must also be obvious that the answers to them would fill a tome in themselves, but they can be answered. They at least serve to remind us not to wonder that hasty conclusions, coloured by self-interest, have led to violent disagreement.

14. See particularly on this question in the United Nations, Fitzmaurice, reported in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* (1952), pp. 137-144.

15. Declaration of May 25, 1950; U.K., U.S.A. and France.

16. U.K.-Egypt, 1954.

Reviews

M. Phillips Price: "A HISTORY OF TURKEY: FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC." (Allen and Unwin, 1956. 20/-.)

During the nineteenth century the thin crust of the international world overlay that area which in diplomatic language was known as the Near East. The centre of this instability was Constantinople, from where the Sultan ruled the wide but decadent Ottoman empire. Czar Nicholas I had thought fit to call him "the sick man of Europe". Western and Russian policy differed on the question of the life span of the sick man as the problems of dismemberment and the establishment of spheres of interest loomed large and serious before the eyes of major European powers. The climax came with the war of 1914, which destroyed four of the five empires based on Europe. The empire of the Turks crumbled, the Arab dominion fell away and all territorial possessions in Europe proper, excepting a small strip of Thrace, were lost. Out of this crucible of war and revolution emerged the new Turkey, republican and nationalist, centred not on the site of ancient Byzantium but on Ankara at the heart of the Anatolian plateau. Since the two world wars the centre of instability has moved still further to the East, to the area that is broadly defined as the Middle East. This area includes the succession states of the old Ottoman empire and also Iran and conceivably extends to Afghanistan and West Pakistan. It is a world which, if the recently created state of Israel be excluded, embraced the centre of that civilized world of our medieval centuries, what we are accustomed to calling Islam. With the continuance of European and American rivalries over the past twenty-five years the key factors have been the maintenance of the waterway known as the Suez Canal, particularly the oil supply, and the growing force of Arab nationalism. During a period of increasing tension in international affairs in the Middle East the Republic of Turkey has been rarely in the news. Preserving strict neutrality during the second world war when the combat swirled around her frontiers, Turkey successfully resisted shortly after the war the pressure exerted by Soviet Russia for an alteration of the treaty respecting the Straits and since then she has remained quietly on the alert. This strange contrast between the Turkey of the nineteenth century and the Turkey of today has rarely been appreciated.

The fault is traceable to ourselves, in particular to our failure to adjust our thinking to a changed picture. We are still, in England and to a great extent in Australia, subject to the impressions given by history books at our high schools. Our studies stopped at 1914 and therefore we tend to be influenced by the events of the Crimean War, by Disraeli's "Peace with Honour" and Gladstone's "Bag and Baggage" speeches, and

the Balkan wars that preceded 1914. The British were less influenced, however, as a nation by their war experiences with the Turks than were the Australians. If Gallipoli went far to making Australia a nation it also dispelled many false notions of decadence and barbarity that had grown round the name of Turk in England from the heroic gestures of Byron to the prophetic thundering of Gladstone.

A more deep-seated misunderstanding of the rôle of Turkey in the modern world springs from the failure of our University history schools to pay sufficient attention to cultures other than that of post-Renaissance Europe. The events of 1939-45 in terms of world history led to the abdication of Europe from the position it had begun to occupy in the sixteenth century. Today a weak and dismembered Europe occupies no more than a restricted part of a peninsula of Asia. The conditions today are more reminiscent of those of the tenth to the fifteenth century, with the one significant difference provided by the existence of the Americas. In this novel situation the descendants of the Osmanli Turks occupy much the same position as their forefathers did when they penetrated Western Anatolia from where they crossed the Aegean. Amid the disintegration and collapse of old empires as wave after wave of marauding invaders swept out of Central Asia to the north and to the south of the Black Sea these people held on grimly to their settled position till the storms blew over. They were successful but the pressure of these world events had dictated their destiny. They were left "facing the West". They mingled their blood with the more intellectually clever, if less physically sturdy Greeks of the coastal region and the Aegean islands. Eventually they were led to extend their interest and their dominion over much of the land of the Balkan peninsula. For long they resisted the temptation of the glittering prize of Constantinople. In the end its capture in 1453 was inevitable, but for long it seemed as if the Turks knew that this city of splendour and of sin would sap their strength and moral fibre. In the aftermath of a disastrous war and amid revolution the nationalist Turks followed Kemal Ataturk as if by instinct to found the new capital at Ankara in the fastness of the Anatolian plateau.

For centuries England's relations with the Ottoman empire were continuous and at times intimate. Travel through the Near East held a particular fascination for the sons and daughters of many families of the English ruling class during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the time when Lady Mary Wortley Montagu accompanied her husband who went as ambassador to Constantinople to the extraordinary adventures of Lady Hester Stanhope (Pitt's niece) and the travels of the author of "Eothen", the eccentric English regularly visited the lands of the Sultan. For a long time and particularly in the days of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Embassy at Constantinople ranked second only to that in Paris in the eyes of the Foreign Service. Close ties were developed between the two peoples at the official levels, through commercial

and banking houses, and above all, through the influence of intrepid individuals who had a lust for adventurous travel. This wholesome tradition has fortunately been carried on down to our generation. Typical is Mr. Philips Price, Labour M.P. for West Gloucester. Educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, he showed quite early an unusual interest in the Near and Middle East. Before the first world war he became acquainted with some of the leaders of the Young Turk Revolution and travelled through central Anatolia on horseback. During the war he acted as correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and followed closely the events on the Caucasian battlefields. He managed to live through the early days of the Russian Revolution in Petrograd and Moscow. He followed closely the course of events in both the Russian and the Turkish Revolutions. A Liberal before 1914, Mr. Price joined the Labour Party after the war and after several attempts secured election to the House of Commons. Defeated in the debacle of 1931, he later returned and has been an active member since. He went back to Turkey more than forty years after his visit and since the war has been back four times.

It is clear that Mr. Price believes zealously in the rôle that Turkey has to play in the defence of the West—its freedom, its institutions and its cultural traditions—against the aggressive might of Soviet Russia. In writing his *History of Turkey* he intends to bring home to the English reader facts and figures about Turkey that will underline its importance to our common defence. He does not set out a detailed history of the Ottoman Empire or of the recent national revolution. It suffices his purpose to reveal the salient features of Turkish development "from empire to republic". The theme that runs through his book is that the Osmanli Turks from their first settlement in Anatolia to the Atatürk revolution "faced the west". To him it was almost a historical accident that they became converted to Islam, which had the effect of overlaying their peasant democratic customary law with the sacred law of the Koran. Although originally an added strength this influence became, particularly after the establishment of the Empire, a baneful one in so far as it stultified all attempts at reform. The Osmanli Turks were never fanatical, showing a measure of tolerance to the Greeks and to other Christians quite early and developing this tolerance to the point of imperial policy when they were brought face to face with the problems of imperial administration. Freed from the rigid code of Islam and from the soporific effects of Constantinople (Istanbul), the renaissance of Turkey under Atatürk was rapid and assured.

Mr. Price is not a trained historian, but he has a sense of history. Much better than most commentators, he has an appreciation of the Russian menace, which for him has little to do with Marxian dialectic. He sees in Turkey a necessary and all-important member of N.A.T.O., because geography has made Turkey the strategic bastion against the

penetration of Soviet Russia's power to the Mediterranean. Turkey is equally a bastion against the spread of Communism. Unlike some members of N.A.T.O., Turkey is not divided on the issue. Turkey's military contribution is one of the most effective to N.A.T.O. She occupies a most exposed flank. If war came the chances are that she would be in it from the start. More recently her political relations with important states of the Islamic world, Irak, Iran and Pakistan, have been strengthened. The key questions are: is Turkey militarily defensible, is she economically viable, is she socially and politically stable? Mr. Price's answers are reassuring. For what it sets out to do, to explain the nature and rôle of modern Turkey to the English reader, Mr. Price's book achieves its purpose.

W. A. TOWNSLEY.

"THE ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT," by Paul H. Casselman. (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1955, pp. vi plus 183. Price \$3.25.)

The author of *The Economics of Employment and Unemployment* is an economist of the Canadian Department of Labour and a part-time professor of economics at the University of Ottawa. The blurb on the dust-cover claims that the book offers "a completely new approach in that it is based upon a blend of economic theory, economic policy, and extra-economic considerations." The author himself in his preface justifies "the publication of a new volume in a field already explored by other writers" with the statement that "we feel that the appearance of this book is warranted because of its new approach, its emphasis on the more practical aspects of the subject, its treatment of aspects of employment which have hitherto been neglected or entirely omitted and its admission of extra-economic considerations in the analysis." These are substantial claims.

The introductory chapter summarising the author's approach in the book is followed by a chapter on *Full Employment* referring to difficulties in the definition of full employment, the nature of employment targets, the conflict between employment policy and other economic and political aims, and the general nature of employment policy. In a following chapter entitled *The Factors Governing Employment* Casselman divides the causes of unemployment (employment) into "economic factors" (eighteen indicated), "non-economic factors" (ten listed) and "economic and non-economic factors" (three mentioned). The four chapters which follow cover *Seasonal Variations in Employment*, *The Business Cycle and Employment*, *Unemployment other than Cyclical and Seasonal* and *Part-time Employment and Under-Employment*. These are followed by a chapter on *Employment Forecasting*. The final chapter offers the author's conclusions.

The author expresses his conviction "that the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment will continue to be one of the world's major economic problems". He warns us, however, that in a world where economic activity since 1945 has so often been stimulated by war and preparations for war, "the supreme test for employment maintenance programmes has not yet been made"—a warning which our governments and planners would do well not to forget. One of the virtues of the book is that it is pragmatic and practical in approach. No doubt this is because the author in his capacity as public servant has had to wrestle with the day-to-day details of unemployment policy and has not always found them tractable. He does not believe that "any one theory can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon that is employment or its counterpart unemployment". While he concedes that full employment policies engineered through the maintenance of a high aggregate demand will make it easier to reduce unemployment from whatever cause, he believes we must have a classification of types of unemployment and seek to find explanations of these different types. This he would regard as important since it would be rash to assume that what are now orthodox full employment policies have yet been fully tested, and since in a large country many causes of unemployment, international, national and local, and social as well as economic, will exist. Only a small portion of the book is therefore devoted to the maintenance of a high level of aggregate demand. The major part of the book is devoted to other types of unemployment and to an examination of their causes. Perhaps it is the author's "practical experience" that leads him to devote by far the longest chapter in the book to seasonal employment, a particularly serious problem in Canada and one that most writers in the post-war period have ignored. This long chapter deals with the causes, characteristics and types of seasonal unemployment, methods of measurement, public measures to reduce seasonal fluctuations in employment (employment advising, organised migration, publicity, research, and insurance are included in the measures discussed), employer action (twenty possible measures are listed), guaranteed employment, the guaranteed annual wage, and the relationship between seasonal movements and general business conditions. A longish chapter is also devoted to the forecasting of employment trends. It is probably the author's experience in administering employment and unemployment policies that justifies his unwillingness to subscribe to rigid employment targets and his emphasis that full employment policies have no necessary priority over other economic and political aims.

The claim by the author that his book is "practical" is well justified. The claim that its approach is new is not justified. It is, if anything, old-fashioned. The emphasis on the need to classify types of unemployment and to seek their causes was surely the approach by Beveridge in his famous book on unemployment published before the war. It was the approach of other writers, too. Nor does there appear to be

much that is new in the long chapter on seasonal variations in employment. Some of the other material, e.g. the problem of guaranteed employment and annual wages, might not have been found in the pre-war books by Beveridge and others but it is to be found in many post-war sources. But to describe the approach as old-fashioned is no criticism. We have since the war concentrated too much attention on the need to maintain effective demand and too little on other causes of unemployment. It is likely that if and when serious unemployment does appear we shall be compelled to supplement the policies for maintaining effective demand with other policies we have been inclined to dismiss as unimportant or old-fashioned.

The book suffers from being both too ambitious and too modest. It is too ambitious in its scope for its modest length of 179 pages of text. In less than two hundred pages the author seeks to cover all aspects of unemployment. While there is little in the book that will be new to those acquainted with the topics discussed, the degree of condensation the author has forced upon himself must have the effect of making his book very difficult reading for the student or the businessman. The chapter on *The Business Cycle and Employment* contains, for example, only twenty-five pages. Yet in these few pages Dr. Casselman touches upon the nature of the business cycle, the phases of the business cycle, methods of measuring cyclical fluctuations in employment, theories of the business cycle (at least a dozen theories receive mention), the control of the business cycle, government policies, the rôle of labour, and international policies. The result would have been more successful had the book been either more modest in scope or less modest in length.

Nevertheless, the large number of topics "listed" (it is not always possible to say "discussed"), together with the good bibliographies at the end of most chapters, serve to provide a useful reference book.

JAMES P. BELSHAW.

"THE HISTORY OF A SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM." Fedor Belov. Routledge, London. International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1956. xiii plus 234, including appendices and index. 21/-.

Since the early 1930's the "collective farm" or "kolkhoz" has dominated the Soviet agricultural landscape. Originally there were 250,000 farming enterprises of that type. Now, as a result of post-war amalgamations, there are 85,700.

Excluding the more directly controlled "sovkhoz" or "State farm", of which there are now 5134, the collective farm provides all Soviet food and raw materials.

Fedor Belov, author of the above volume, was born in the Ukrainian village in which the farm of which he speaks is situated. His birth took place shortly after the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Discharged after World War II as captain, he was soon afterwards offered the chairmanship of a collective farm in his native Ukrainian village. Being elected by the kolkhoz general meeting, he served for nearly three years from 1947 to 1949.

Disagreements with the authorities over farm management led to his recall to the Soviet Army in Germany. Thence in 1951 he defected to West Germany, from which he moved to U.S.A. There the American Research Programme on the U.S.S.R. translated, edited and produced Belov's volume.

If one remembers that G. Malenkov lost his post as Soviet Premier ostensibly owing at least partially to deficiencies in agricultural policy, and that J. Stalin himself was posthumously attacked on the same grounds, Belov's book should be all the more topical.

Of course, a single collective farm would be inadequate as a basis for a general criticism of a system. It would be well to examine evidence on a more extensive scale.

At the conclusion of a book recently published in Moscow by the State Publishing Agency, *Pobeda Kolkhoznoy Stroya v U.S.S.R., 1954* (*The Victory of the Collective Farm System*), certain admissions on the Soviet side are made by the author, M. A. Kraev. They include the Communist Party's Central Committee's revelation of "the existence of serious deficiencies in the conduct of agriculture; bureaucratic methods of management, mistakes in planning; excessive centralisation; cumbersome planning structures; lack of personal responsibility on part of Soviet and party organisations for the condition of kolkhozes and machine tractor stations; inadequate attention to the selection of supervisory staffs of M.T.S. and kolkhozes" (M. A. Kraev, pp. 713-4).

It may then fairly be assumed that despite Belov's defection, he does give personal chapter and verse in one corner of the vast Soviet dominions for many weaknesses which the Soviet Administration recognises as existing.

How typical is the area where Belov's kolkhoz is situated? It is in the Western Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper River that flows into the Black Sea.

The locality was the most technically advanced of the Tsar's Empire as far as the purely Russian regions were concerned. It had the highest pre-revolutionary population density. Polish control had been dominant there until the end of the eighteenth century. (Cf. G. Pavlovsky, *Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution*, pp. 48-50).

German forces occupied the Ukraine—and Belov's farm—twice in the present century, once in 1918 and later 1941-3.

Belov's first chapter traces events to 1947. He chronicles the establishment of the collective farm system in the spring of 1930. (At that date the author was about ten years of age.)

He indicates that it was the "artel" form—originally a Russian term

applied to a sort of co-operative guild of people pursuing a similar occupation—that was to be compulsorily introduced as the basis of collective farming.

Members were allowed to have as their own property small allotments for vegetable growing or livestock raising. Otherwise all farm land, livestock and implements were to be collectively held.

By 1932 80% of the peasant households in Belov's "raion" (district) had been brought under the system. In the twenty-four villages of the district there were fifty-two "kolkhozes" and three "sovkhozes" (State-farms).

One might interpolate here—a fact not mentioned by Belov—that by 1937 the kolkhoz system had embraced 18 million peasant households, i.e. 93%, while the "kolkhozes" and the "sovkhozes" (State-farms) controlled 99% of the cultivated land of the Soviet countryside.

As A. Uralov (another Soviet intellectual who defected) put it, "The ancient basis of the peaceful life of the country had been destroyed and a new form of social life had triumphed." (*The Kolkhoz Revolution*, p. 165, "The Reign of Stalin", trans. L. J. Smith, London, 1953.)

On pp. 12 and 13 of his book Belov mentions the terrible famine of 1932-3 which, he implies, was the result of the government grain collection at the time. The general industrialisation with the accompanying Five-Year Plan was proceeding.

After 1934 conditions improved. The cash income in Belov's kolkhoz was derived from sugar beet, vegetables, dairy produce and fish. Vegetables, honey, vegetable oil and fruit were sent to large urban centres like Leningrad, Minsk and Kiev.

Before World War II, owing to the number of draught animals available, the kolkhoz did not need to invoke much assistance from the M.T.S. (machine tractor station). That meant less outlay. (Today, of course, the M.T.S. is the central feature of all the collective farms.)

Until 1941 the collective farm of Belov lived relatively well. Then more governmental pressure began to be applied for more deliveries to the State. Remuneration according to "labour days" began to fluctuate. Belov examines the significance of "labour days" on p. 87. The value of this type of payment depends on the kind of work done and ultimately on a share of the total kolkhoz product after State and communal needs have been met. It is partly paid in kind and partly in cash.

World War II had a catastrophic effect on Belov's district. The kolkhoz had to be re-established. Actually it meant the creation of a new organisation just as in 1930 (p. 21).

Chapter 11 gives a useful analysis of the kolkhoz structure. The description of the "general meeting", at a session of which he himself was elected chairman, is treated on pp. 35-7.

On p. 45 one is informed of the extent to which women were used for manual work on the farm. "While most of the 'brigadiers' or farm-

work supervisors were men, the field brigades themselves consisted entirely of women." The "squad leaders" or sub-supervisors were also all women.

In Chapter IV, overcentralisation of planning is criticised. As seen earlier, the present Party controllers have recognised this weakness. Decentralisation in agricultural planning is now the vogue in the Soviet.

Chapter V discusses "Labour, Equipment and Draft Power." In it Belov remarks: "The farm was in a bad state when I took it over. The war and its aftermath had left it short of manpower, equipment and livestock. Furthermore, there had in 1946 been a drought and there had been heavy compulsory deliveries . . . the farm's horses had the mange so badly that they were entirely hairless" (p. 167).

In assessing Belov as a kolkhoz chairman, one must not forget his remark at the beginning of the chapter.

"When I took over the kolkhoz in the spring of 1947 . . . I was very inexperienced, not having worked on a farm since the age of fifteen."

He stresses the paucity of able-bodied men, partly the result of war and partly of industrial recruitment (p. 108).

A current problem in Soviet production receives mention in Chapter VII—the shortage of livestock and livestock products. The problem was not a new one. It had been a pre-revolutionary phenomenon—a legacy of the open-field or three-field system of agriculture that prevailed in the old days.

Shortage of fodder and inadequate shelter did not help to improve matters or reduce animal mortality.

(One might refer here to a recent Soviet decree promulgated in August last and published in *Pravda* placing a tax upon the owners of livestock raised privately in or near the cities for domestic use. Such livestock were declared to be causing a possible shortage of grain and foodstuffs for human consumption.)

As a result of post-war policy "agro-cities" were to be created to combine kolkhozes and urbanise the countryside. Urbanisation was soon abandoned, but the total number of collective farms was considerably reduced. Belov shows that in his district 46 collective farms became 18. Some of these farms equalled 8,000 hectares in area (1 hectare = 2.5 acres).

The post-war housing crisis was to be tackled by a newly-established authority.

Belov declares (p. 161): "During the years of Soviet rule no housing construction had been undertaken in the villages."

Chapter IX stresses the fact, often ignored, that the kolkhoz system does have a private property element. The peasant household has private property rights to a house, a homestead plot, implements and livestock. But such rights are not transferable and depend on participation in kolkhoz activities.

In his "Conclusion" Belov's fall from power as kolkhoz Chairman is narrated. The book ends on a depressing note. Belov asserts:—

"Whereas before the war the peasants had done better work with more willingness, by 1950-1 they regarded work with the attitude of prisoners going to forced labour" (p. 194-5).

Does this statement explain the current attempt of the ruling Party to endeavour to cultivate the personal interest of the Russian countryman in the problem of the need for more food and more raw materials, to assist both the more urbanised modern Russian and to supply the ever-growing industrial needs of both town and country?

Belov's views are of course coloured by the circumstances of his defection. Yet the present Russian leaders are not disguising their agricultural difficulties. If Siberia in ten years is to be the Soviet's greatest industrial base, can Kazakhstan (the former Turkestan north of Afghanistan and Persia and west of Chinese Sinkiang and Tibet) become the Soviet "bread basket", providing huge quantities of grain in directly-run sovkhozes or State farms by the ploughing up of countless acres of virgin soil with the aid of eastward-moving migrants? If so, will some of the problems of the old European collective farms be solved by thus easing the burden upon them? These questions happen to be in some measure answered in recent issues of the Russian newspaper *Pravda*.

As a supplement to this examination of Belov's book some current statistics might be worth attention.

By 10th Oct. of the present year slightly over 1,000 million poods of wheat¹ had been handed over to the Government by the Kazakhstan State farms, collective farms and M.T.S., 402 millions more than planned; more, too, than had been handed over in the previous eleven years combined, before the ploughing up of virgin soil and wastelands. 600,000 citizens from other parts of the Soviet dominions had come to assist. 23 million hectares were sown to grain in 1956 instead of 7 million hectares as in 1953. Of this State farms accounted for 10.3 million hectares, or nine times as much, while collective farms ploughed up 12.4 million hectares, or twice as much. (*Pravda*, 12th Oct., 1956.)

In the new areas of resettlement 337 large new State grain farms had been created and played a leading rôle. The State farms gave 502 million poods of grain compared with 25.3 millions produced before the new lands were developed. Kazakhstan is now second only to the Russian Socialist Federative Republic as a food producer. (*Pravda*, 12th Oct., 1956.) An interesting map appears in the same issue showing the numerous new State farms created in the districts of Kazakhstan south of the Trans-Siberian Railway around Chelyabinsk, Petropavlovsk and Omsk near the Irtysh River. (N.B.: 1 pood = 36 pounds and 1 hectare = 2.5 acres.)

Furthermore, in *Pravda*, 14th Oct. of this year, it is reported that the

1. Approximately 16.6 million tons.

chief Soviet Republic, the R.S.F.S.R., has supplied to the Government 2,004 million poods of wheat² or 319 millions more than planned. This amount is reported to be approximately the same as the whole Soviet Union supplied to the Government in 1953 (2,010 million poods). It was 580 million poods higher than the complete 1955 production of the R.S.F.S.R. The farming area here involved included the Northern Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, together with the Middle Volga River, and thence through Siberia to Lake Baikal. 14.9 hectares of new land were put under the plough. New State farms organised on virgin soil in the R.S.F.S.R. gave almost as much to the State as all the collective farms in the R.S.F.S.R. in 1953.

One might note that in *Pravda* of the dates above-mentioned virgin soil and wasteland were claimed as having been ploughed up and sown to the extent of a total of 34.7 million hectares (i.e. about 86.75 million acres), which means that in Siberia and Kazakhstan where this cultivation has taken place, a great resettlement has occurred in the area of Siberia adjacent to the Trans-Siberian Line between the Ural Mountains and the Altai Range (on the borders of China near Lake Baikal).

This approach of Russian colonisation to the frontiers of the Chinese dominions provides an interesting prospect for future consideration in the relationships of the two countries.

Finally, it might be remarked that the agricultural crisis which was evident in 1953 has, if the above statistics are correct, been solved not so much by the channel of the collective farm as by that of the direct State farms largely developed in the hitherto unworked Siberian-Kazakh agricultural belt. If Soviet industry is migrating Asia-wards, so is agriculture with its now industrialised technique of the Machine Tractor Stations!

No foreigner can fail to be intrigued by the Soviet collective farming system. That it is to be the pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural expansion makes it all the more worthy of the attention of ourselves.

Belov provides a valuable piece of personal contemporary evidence, despite his hostile tendency.

The book's Appendices include extracts from Belov's diaries, a catalogue of Soviet Press references to kolkhoz affairs 1949-55, a note on Party Secretary N. S. Khrushchov's Report of 1953 and listed indications of recent Soviet policy changes in the agricultural field.

The volume is a credit to the printers and publishers.

2. Approximately 33.2 million tons. Therefore, the combined total of R.S.F.S.R. and Kazakhstan would be nearly 50 million tons.

L. A. OWEN.

"RED, BLACK, BLOND AND OLIVE," by Edmund Wilson.
(W. H. Allen, London, 25/-.)

Edmund Wilson, the American critic and essayist, is now in his sixties. Although he earns his livelihood in New York he takes his relaxation in—to quote him—"the kind of foreign travel which has as its main motive simple curiosity". That is probably the best kind of travel; it certainly makes Edmund Wilson a fine travelling companion for he is a critical observer with a great ability to build vivid pictures well framed in the stout oak of painstaking study and research. If you enjoyed *The Dead Sea Scrolls* you will equally enjoy *Red, Black, Blond and Olive* for it displays the same skilled authorship.

Red, Black, Blond and Olive is a study of four civilizations ranging from an obscure part of continental America through the Caribbean to the U.S.S.R. and Israel. Much of the work has previously appeared in essays published in the *New Yorker*, the *Reporter*, *New Republic* and *Travel* magazines. Brought together in book form the four essays cover twenty years of Edmund Wilson's travels. We find him as something of a lay anthropologist amongst the Zuni Indians of New Mexico in 1947, as a rebel against unshaped society in Haiti in 1949, as a dilettante of communism in early Stalinist Russia and as a student of Hebrew looking through classical eyes at the Israel of 1954. In the book as a whole we can see develop a method of travel writing which has much to commend it: copious note-taking in the field, further advanced research on return to base and finally detached and critical writing in the quiet of memory.

Frankly, until reading the first of these four essays I have never thought of the American Indian as anything but a people buried in the great American expansion and resurrected only for the convenience of Hollywood. Edmund Wilson has, however, walked the path of the anthropologist to bring to light the Zuni Indians of New Mexico. They are an interesting and isolated group of "red" skins who have managed to survive the massacres and the avalanche of Coca-Cola, TV and automobiles to maintain their tribal customs almost unchanged. Numbering some 25,000, the Zunis have spurned all the efforts of the Church and the Indian Bureau to bring them within the orbit of Washington and remain a people still looking to heaven through paint-faced gods and holding their tribal law as higher than that of the State. Their ancient rites and the strange Shalako ceremonies, when the desert gods dance to frenzied exhaustion in the pueblo, are carried on despite efforts to suppress them. The Zuni have absorbed only what they have found to be convenient in modern America and their strange rhythms play on against a background of the popping of bubble gum.

Edmund Wilson finds himself in sympathy with the Zuni. When he is not closely watching their esoteric rites he is referring us to anthropologists who did, and when he is not avidly note-taking he is blushing with shame at the American treatment of the Indian. And all this in

bungalows built on a dry plain and crowded with painted faces and the stench of the primitive.

In a passing reference to the Navaho Indians he speaks of them as worse off for their loss of tribal integrity and as the victims of broken treaties.

In Haiti Edmund Wilson takes us to a "black" people with a dash of French. This visit to the Caribbean in 1949 confirmed in him a thought first grasped amongst the Zunis, that the Western life has little to offer to people without the Christian world. Although not himself experiencing Voodoo ecstasy he retales at length the observations of other Americans who examined the cult deeply; he concludes that it offers its devotees as much or as little as the essentially French Christianity wished upon the people in their colonial days.

Rather than attempt to understand the political complexities of Haitian life, Edmund Wilson sought to discover national character in the works of Haitian authors. On the whole he seems to have been rather disappointed in what he found. Perhaps he expected too much: lack of a real national language, the designs of piratical politicians playing the mixed Negro and mulatto populations would tend to make the Haitian not yet a full person. A rather long aside dealing with the failure of an early ambitious UNESCO project at Marbial makes interesting reading.

In travelling "blond" Edmund Wilson shows us Soviet Russia in 1935; he shows, too, himself as a younger man disillusioned first by the U.S.A. recovering from the Depression and disillusioned later by a U.S.S.R. entering the purge era.

This part of the book is much in the form of a travel diary which rambles us through Leningrad theatres, Moscow's literary circles, the peasant communities on the Volga and finally a sojourn in an Odessa hospital where the author had time to read Russian classics, observe the habits of bed-bugs—"klopy" to the Russians—and recover from scarlet fever.

There is little doubt that Edmund Wilson went to Russia expecting a good deal. He was not totally disappointed and ended his visit agreeing with other American tourists whom he met that the U.S.S.R. was a "safe" place to grow old in. He was annoyed by the lack of punctuality and found in it a differing time sense from the American. His observations on the similarities between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are highly pertinent today; he found the same social democracy and the same large-scale thinking inevitable of people whose homeland is a continent.

The concluding essay of this worthwhile book reveals the thoroughness of Edmund Wilson as a professional author. In order that he could the better understand the Israeli he embarked on a study of classical Hebrew prior to his visit to the "olive" people. Much of this study was turned to good use in his *Dead Sea Scrolls*, of course, but apart from that it does serve to highlight the difficulties existing in Israel of welding the

Palestinian Jew with the immigrant population. The study and reinterpretation of Genesis from the original Hebrew tends to point up the cleavage between Western and Eastern thought. In simple terms this is seen as the literal interpretation of the Pentateuch by a group as small as the Samaritans (numbering only about 250)—a sequence vividly told by Edmund Wilson. This essay ends with the conclusion that the differences of Jewish thought from other Western thought tend only to emphasise the similarity of the peoples.

In a short Postscript Edmund Wilson writes that *Red, Black, Blond and Olive* is to be his last record of foreign travel. "In the years still before me," he tells us he will deal with "the life that I ought to know best." We may regret his decision for his travels have been always interesting and always pertinent.

RICHARD ASPINALL.

**"THE PATTERN OF WORLD CONFLICT," by G. L. Arnold, London.
(The Dial Press, New York, 1955, pp. 250.)**

Mr. Arnold is concerned in this book with the constructive task of indicating possible courses of action for Western civilization which will avoid, on the one hand, a cataclysmic atomic war, and on the other a victory for some undesirable form of totalitarian control. As one of the editors of the *Twentieth Century*, and as a frequenter of Chatham House, he is not unaware that any addition to the growing volume of literature on this subject needs rather special justification. His plea for this book, which seems to be aimed primarily at American readers, is that his starting point—the reality of the Atlantic Community—represents, together with his analysis of the significance of public planning in the non-Communist world, a new synthesis of thought held by various groups in Europe and America.

In the course of reaching his conclusions, which are admirably condensed in the final chapter, Mr. Arnold uses techniques of political, economic and military analysis. He seems most at home as he traverses the broader reaches of Western political history and as he analyzes the variants of Communism. In the extensive central section of the book, where an endeavour is made to relate changing economic and trade patterns to the general theme of the book, Mr. Arnold relies rather heavily on particular writings of others such as W. Arthur Lewis, T. Balogh, and H. W. Arndt. This section is relatively heavily footnoted and some readers will be glad to reach again the freer style, and in places brilliant expression, with which Mr. Arnold clothes his political analysis.

In opening up the very broad subject, Mr. Arnold examines the way in which the *Pax Britannica* influenced world affairs between the Napoleonic wars and 1914. *Pax Britannica* never meant the absence of local wars, but it did stop such conflicts from becoming global. In the years

between 1918 and 1939 the "imperfect and vulnerable" *Pax Americana* haltingly took over from the *Pax Britannica*. But the transfer occurred too suddenly for American public opinion to become aware of its new responsibilities, and Britain, without adequate power in the new circumstances, confused the issue, says Mr. Arnold, by acting in some ways as if the centre of gravity of the West were still London instead of Washington and New York.

World War II cleared up misconceptions about relative military power. "The truth is that . . . Britain, Germany and Japan . . . lost their former status *vis-à-vis* the only two great powers left in the contemporary world, and become spectators, or at most secondary figures, in a conflict transcending the old national and political boundaries." But once again the real significance of the changing pattern has been clouded, at least in Western thought, by the "exercises in neoliberal Utopianism" that surrounded the negotiations of 1945 and the establishment of the United Nations. Mr. Arnold has some very hard things to say about Western policy-makers who were naïve enough to think that monopoly of atomic weapons would continue and that conventional diplomacy could be replaced by the San Francisco Charter. However, the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 represented a partial return to reality, emphasizing the transition from the "euphoria of the immediate post-war period to the acceptance of a divided world".

What really are the fundamentals of the current situation? Mr. Arnold accepts the view that for reasons of self-preservation neither Russia nor United States will draw into an all-out atomic war in the immediate future. In fact Russia, following basic Communist doctrine, assumes that co-existence is possible and desirable until the Western world (wrongly identified with the capitalist system) weakens as a result of internal conflicts. With adequate integration of nationalist movements Communism can look forward, Russia argues, to a certain win in the final grandiose clash. The West, on the other hand, affirms the possibility of genuinely peaceful co-existence between the two blocs, pending the gradual unification of world society. In this atmosphere, Mr. Arnold believes, we may well have to settle down to a patience-testing cold war lasting perhaps for a generation. World conflict reduces itself to competition for adherents either to Communism or democracy (not liberalism, since the modernization of backward areas needs quasi-socialist planning, and anyway *laissez-faire* is dead).

Mr. Arnold considers that, so far as the interests of the West in the cold war are concerned, the United Nations is almost valueless. But NATO has tremendous possibilities and, properly nurtured and developed, could become the "solid core of the world-wide association of all non-Communist countries." Mr. Arnold goes to some pains to warn Americans that the alternative to a smoothly working "Atlantic Community" organization will be a crude mechanical construction of an

American empire with a ring of satellites, many of which will drop away into neutralism at any real sign of danger.

The "Atlantic Union" concept which Mr. Arnold urges so strongly represents in his view a sharp advance beyond the notion of a western Europe vaguely associated with the United States. It recognizes the westward shift in the centre of gravity since the first world war and if brought into action could create the conditions for easing the problems associated with exclusive nation-state sovereignties in Europe. Experience of the Western world in the last ten years, Mr. Arnold believes, shows the need for a central authority strong enough to make decisions for the area in defence, foreign affairs and economics. Nothing less will stop the drift toward nationalism and neutralism that has latterly become so marked in Europe and America alike.

On the economic side the Atlantic Community, through widening currency blocs and the easing of trade barriers, could raise income levels of the less fortunately placed members while stimulating economic progress all round. Exploitive colonialism by European powers in backward areas, which has been an effective target for Communist attack, could give way to jointly regulated allocation of capital for development (i.e. like Point Four allocations and the Colombo Plan). It would be absurd, according to Mr. Arnold, to try to achieve economic adjustments necessary to a properly functioning confederation without economic planning and control. Such a view, he believes, is now accepted in all but the extremist free enterprise camps (and in "the general backwash of obscurantism that carried the Republican Party to power in 1952").

What the Communist countries may be doing while the Atlantic Community pursues its plan for democratic survival is discussed by Mr. Arnold against a very interesting historical analysis of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. An industrial proletariat is no longer a necessary pre-requisite for revolution, as the Chinese have shown. Moreover, Communism and nationalism run well together. Mr. Arnold sees the Communist world seeking adherents through encouragement of State centralization and "revolution from above".

Looking at his projection of the pattern of conflict, Mr. Arnold is moderately hopeful that an uneasy equilibrium will be maintained long enough, first for a genuine strategy of co-existence to develop and, at a later stage, for tension to lower sufficiently for the "two worlds" to come together.

Some who read this book will be repelled by assertions that Mr. Arnold mixes in with otherwise pleasing analysis. Others will regret the length of some deviations from the main theme. But all readers will probably admit, as your reviewer does, that the writer has provided many stimulating lines of thought on a critical subject at an opportune time. Those who test the conclusions, written in 1955, against the events of 1956 should have additional respect for G. L. Arnold.

BRUCE A. ALLAN.

"FLIGHT AND RESETTLEMENT," by H. B. Murphy and Others. (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), 1955, pp. 231.

This is an important book the purpose of which is to point out the mental hazards to which the war, displacement, persecution and starvation expose their victims. The book was edited by Dr. H. B. Murphy, a psychiatrist who first became interested in refugees during the war when he came in contact with partisan groups in Italy and the Balkans. His subsequent medical appointments under UNRRA and the IRO gave him first-hand knowledge of the problem of mental health of refugees. Dr. Murphy contributes a most comprehensive Introduction as well as four chapters and a useful bibliography of the subject. He also edits contributions by the members of a group of twelve psychiatrists and social workers, all of whom have had first-hand experience with the problem of refugees and their resettlement.

The book consists of four parts, the first three of which ("The First Step," "Displaced Persons," "Normal Resettlement") contain a number of studies and descriptions of individuals in flight (by S. A. Prins and S. Pedersen), displaced Polish and Jewish children (by Louise Pinsky), psychology of concentration camp inmates (by Dr. Henri Stern), and a most illuminating and penetrating study of "D.P. Apathy" (by Dr. Eduard Bakis). An excellent chapter by E. Rysdal brings into sharp relief the joint impact of physical disability combined with displacement in a colony for the blind D.P.'s in Norway. Miriam L. Gaertner contributes an interesting comparison of refugee immigrants from Europe and Puerto Ricans in New York. The physical conditions of refugee camps and the institutional set-up of resettlement are described in separate chapters by Dr. Murphy, who also contributes a chapter on the attitude to refugee immigrants in Australia.¹ A survey of British experience in the field of refugee absorption is supplied by Dr. Maud Bulbring and Mrs. Elizabeth Nagy.

Part Four of the book is meant chiefly for the specialist reader, consisting as it does of four pages dealing with the psychological problems of refugees from the angle of depth psychology. The contributions in this part include chapters on the treatment and prognosis of mentally ill refugees in Switzerland (by Dr. M. Pfister-Amende), psychosomatic disorders (by Dr. Liebus Tyhurst), and the refugees' paranoid reaction (by Dr. F. F. Kino). Dr. Murphy contributes to this part a paper on the refugee's psychoses in Great Britain which is interesting to many a non-psychiatrist since it purports to illustrate casual relationship between the degree of cultural isolation and mental hospitalization rates in a group of migrants.

1. This chapter, based largely on the author's personal observations during his visit to Australia in 1950, seems slightly out of date, particularly in view of the fact that many problems associated with the initial Adjustment of ex-D.P.'s in Australia have by now been overcome. But it still remains an interesting survey of refugee response and fits well into the symposium.

The brief survey of the contents of the book which Dr. Murphy and his colleagues have written may give an impression of a rather disjointed symposium on the subject. This is not the case, however; the editor has given the book essential unity in so far as the individual contributions are concerned with various aspects of one central problem—what Dr. Adam Curle called “social re-connection” of uprooted persons.² It is for this reason that the book deserves to be read by all students of migration since it deals with all the major characteristic problems of immigrants: a feeling of anxiety, of insecurity of their place in the community and non-belonging to a new alien world. It is to be hoped that all who play a part in Australia's post-war migration programme will profit from the reading of this book since it not only gives a better understanding of the background of nearly 200,000 migrants who were shipped here from IRO camps in Europe but it also adds to our knowledge of the social aspect of migration in general.

2. Adam Curle, “Transitional Communities and Social Re-connection,” *Human Relations*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 and 2.

J. ZUBRZYCKI.

